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Abstract
Spillover Effects in Financial and International Development
John Dogbey
The main objective of this dissertation is to explore some possible externalities that exist
in the international context in the areas of finance and development economics. Chapter one is an
introduction to this study. Chapter two examines contagion in exchange market pressure,
currency crisis and currency stability. In this chapter I test whether exchange market pressure, in
general, is contagious and proceed to test separately for contagion in currency crisis and currency
stability. I construct an index of exchange market pressure for a panel of 118 countries and
choose a threshold from which positive or negative deviations denote currency crisis and
currency stability respectively.
The need to test for contagion in currency stability is to find out whether contagion is
only a crises phenomenon. Currency crisis and currency stability spread by geography, trade and
financial markets. Using spatial econometric models and constructing the appropriate trade and
geography weight matrixes, I estimate the magnitude of the contagion by trade and geography
respectively. I find that both transmission mechanisms do significantly transmit currency crisis
and currency stability, but trade is more contagious than geography alone. I also find that
currency stability is more contagious than currency stability. The results also suggest that trade
channel is solely responsible for contagious currency crises that are not regional while the
combination of the trade and geography channels of transmission are responsible for the
prevalent nature of regional contagious currency crises.
In chapter three I test for contagion in financial development both in levels and in change
of financial development. The main measure of financial development considered for this
analysis is domestic banking, but I use banking development and stock market development in
some cases for robustness checks. I define domestic banking development as domestic credit to
the private sector as a percentage of GDP. I explain contagion channels of geography, trade and
financial linkages and, using spatial econometric models, test for these for a panel of 98
countries for the geography and trade regressions and a panel of 30 countries (OECD countries)
for the financial linkages regression. The results show that financial development and change of
financial development are contagious of almost the same magnitude. I also find that the greatest
channel of contagion is financial linkages followed closely by trade and geography. The results
also suggest that other control variables such as bureaucratic quality and legal environment are
important for financial development.
In chapter four, I empirically investigate why ethno-linguistic fractionalization has not
dissipated in African countries. This is based on the idea that if trade spreads economic events
across countries that engage in trade, why do we not have a single or few dominant language(s)
spreading through the African continent? Similarly, why does geography not help propagate such
things as a lingua in Africa?
The chapter explains that one of the main factors that have perpetuated ethno-linguistic
fractionalization in Africa is colonial rule. Countries and or regions that have long years of
colonial rule may be fractionalized than countries and regions with shorter years of colonial rule.
Second, colonial barriers have helped perpetuate the fractionalization by limiting trade among
African countries, even in the face of increasing globalization. I investigate this in a regression
that measures colonial rule as the number of years a country has been colonized while

controlling for other determinants of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. In chapter five, I
summarize the conclusions of the study.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction, Review of Literature and Dissertation Overview
1.1. Introduction
The global economy has seen a lot of spillovers usually referred to as economic contagion. The
term “spillover” or “contagion” in an international context means shocks coming from a related
country or an event that affects most or all countries in the world. Such events obviously include
currency crises and financial crises such as credit freezes. Other less conspicuous contagious
events are currency stability, and the spread of or the evolution of a common language or trade
language among societies.
Chiodo and Owyang (2002) define currency crisis as a speculative attack on a country‟s
currency brought about by agents attempting to alter their portfolio by buying another currency
with the currency of the domestic country. There are three generations of currency crises and
four factors that cause and exacerbate currency crises namely domestic debt, pegged exchange rate,
expectations, and the state of financial markets.

For the first generation model, Pesenti and Tille (2000) explain that when governments
have huge debts under fixed exchange rate regimes, it makes economic agents doubt the
government‟s ability to sustain the peg and hence sell the local currency to hold foreign currency
against possible devaluation. This is also possible during government bailouts as pointed out by
Calvo and Mendoza (1996).
The second generation model explains that geographic neighbors, trade partners and the
world‟s financial markets are responsible for the spread of currency crises. Pesenti and Tille
(2000) explain that when foreign investors expect devaluations, they will ask a high premium
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which increases borrowing cost and limits credit opportunities and governments abandon the
peg. The third generation model explains that because the banks and the financial markets are
fragile, increases in interest rates makes firms‟ default rate high, and this becomes lending
constraints. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) explain the twin problem between the banking sector
and currency crises.
Financial development is believed to have played a great role in the economic growth of
many countries during the recent trend towards globalization. Stulz (2005) points out that high
risks of expropriation and thus insecure property rights limit financial development and the
ability of a country to take advantage of financial globalization. Johnson, McMillan and
Woodruff (2002) show the positive relationship between private sector enforcement, financial
development and investment and growth.
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) show that the effect of liberalization on economic
growth is greater if a country starts from above average level of financial development. Also,
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007) find that domestic banking development is one of
the important requirements in exploiting growth opportunities. Hermes and Lensink (1999)
explore the relationship between growth, FDI and financial development and conclude that
financial development is one of the prerequisites for a country to realize the full growth potential
of FDI.
Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Fulkes (2003) provide an empirical evidence supporting the
Schumpeterian Theory of Convergence and conclude that countries with a certain critical level
of financial development have a likelihood of converging to the world–technology frontier and
that other countries have far lower long-run growth.
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Ethno-linguistic fractionalization has received a lot of attention in the development
literature. Specifically, most people believe that it is one of the problems that contribute to the
demise of the African continent in particular. Poor institutions are primarily responsible for
fractionalization in Africa. In other words, by controlling for institutions the negative impact of
institutions on growth disappears. Colonial artificial institutions are also responsible for the
limited trade in Africa and the resultant poor growth (Leeson, 2005; Easterly, 2001; Easterly and
Levine, 1997).
The relationship between colonial rule and growth has also been explored. Different
measures of colonization have been found to account for poor growth in Africa. These measures
include the length of colonial rule, colonial penetration and colonial history.

1.2. Literature Review
The literature review consists of brief review of the empirical literature of each topic and a
discussion of my contribution to the existing literature. In the currency crises literature, Edwards
(2000) employ VAR to investigate volatility contagion. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996)
and Glick and Rose (1999) employ probit models to address contagion in currency crises. The
later two literature use dummies as the measures of currency crisis and hence probit estimation
procedures to find the presence and or magnitude of the contagion.
This is the first study that uses a spatial econometric model to study contagion in
currency crises. The hallmark of chapter 2 is that it attempts to measure trade and geographic
channels of currency crises transmission separately as well as examine the effects of economic
fundamentals on currency crises (the extent to which economic fundamentals aggravate currency
crises in a country). This model has the advantage of accounting for multi-directional effects as
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opposed to unidirectional effects captured in the conventional econometrics models. In addition,
it is also convenient for situations where spatial dependence exists in the data.
This study produce evidence supporting the hypothesis that trade is contagious in
transmitting currency crises and or exchange market pressure from one country to the other and
that it does so to a larger extent than existing findings. Second, this chapter also examines
whether contagion is only crises phenomenon. It shows that there is contagion during strong and
stable currency periods, the impact through trade and geographic linkages is positive and that
trade linkages have a larger magnitude in this case than during currency crises. For geography,
the magnitude is same as during currency crises.
Also, this study examines whether macroeconomic channels are economically significant
in explaining currency crises or exchange market pressure. The findings suggest that trade has
been the dominant factor to which geography is next. These two channels explain why during
currency crises, some countries are infected while some are not. For example, it explains why
during the Asian Crisis in 1997-98 countries like Russia and some Asian countries were prey to
the endemic crisis, but countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were not infected even
though they are in the same region. Or, why the Tequila Crisis in Latin America during 1994-95
infected other Latin American countries and Hungary but did not affect Chile.
This chapter poses the question, given that a country experiences currency crises or some
level of exchange market pressure, what percentage of it is attributable to trade channels or
geographic channels?
In the financial development literature, a lot of studies use financial development as
exogenous variable to either explain growth, FDI or other economic variables. Much more
related to this study which endogenizes financial development is Koubi (2008). In his study, he
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controlled for initial per-capita GDP, legal environment and bureaucratic quality to find how
these variables determined financial development.
This study tests whether the amount of private credit being advanced to the private sector
in one country depends on what is prevailing in the private credit markets of other countries.
Second, it attempts to find out what the transmission mechanisms are and what the magnitude of
the contagion is in each case. The Schumpeterian theory of convergence propounds that
countries beyond a certain level of financial development converge to the world technology
frontier. This chapter therefore examines how countries attain the necessary level of financial
development needed for growth convergence. It identifies three channels of contagion in
financial development namely financial linkages, trade and geography.
My results suggest that each of these is a significant channel through which financial
development can spread from one country to the other. Specifically, it finds which channel is
more effective and more responsible for the spread and growth of financial development in
countries. Whiles no single channel seem to be the sole means of transmission, my results show
that financial linkages is a more effective means followed closely by trade and geography.
The ethno-linguistic fractionalization literature also comprises of quite a lot of papers that
use ethno-linguistic fractionalization as an exogenous variable. One related study that
endogenizes ethno-linguistic fractionalization is Leeson (2005), but it is not an empirical study.
This study empirically examines how ethno-linguistic fractionalization is determined and
explains why it seems to be perpetuated in some regions of the world, specifically on the
continent of Africa.
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1.3. Dissertation Overview
This study focuses on economic contagion in the areas of financial and economic development.
In other words, the main objective of this dissertation is to explore some possible externalities
that exist in the international context in the areas of finance and economic development.
The dissertation uses spatial econometric models to measure contagion. Spatial
econometric models are especial appropriate and useful when there exists spatial dependence in
the data under consideration. The two types of spatial models are spatial error model and spatial
autoregressive model. Spatial autoregressive model (SAR) specifies a country‟s dependent
variable as a function of the weighted value of the dependent variable of its neighbors or
partners. It takes lags over geographic distance. Spatial error model (SEM) specifies the error
term of a country‟s dependable variable as a function of the weighted value of the dependent
variable of its geographic neighbors or partners. The dissertation also uses OLS specifications as
well as seeming unrelated models to estimate certain variables. The rest of the dissertation is
organized as follows: chapter 2, 3, and 4 presents the empirical work and chapter 5 summarizes
the findings of the study.
Chapter 2 looks at contagion in the area of exchange market pressure. It asks whether
exchange market pressure, currency crisis, and currency stability are contagious. Decomposing
geographic channels and trade channels of currency crises provides the ability to answer two
questions in the currency crises literature. The first is why are currency crises regional? The
second is why do some countries not within geographical locations of currency crises zones get
infected while some closer do not get infected? For example, why the Tequila Crisis in Latin
America during 1994-95 infected Hungary and other Latin American countries but did not affect
Chile?
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The chapter finds that because the geographic channel is not as strong as the trade
channel, a distant country that has trade links with the infected country is more likely to be
infected than a neighbor who has no trade links with the infected country. Also crises are
regional because neighbors do have some minimal trade linkages and this together with the
geography linkages produces an amalgamating effect that is usually bigger than the magnitude of
trade linkages alone. Also he found that contagion is not only crises phenomenon but is more
pronounced during stable and strong currency period, especially by trade.
Chapter 3 studies contagion in financial development, exploring the possibilities of
contagion in financial development both at levels and change of financial development. The
chapter answers the question how do countries attain the necessary level of financial
development needed for growth convergence? It identified three channels of financial
development namely financial linkages, trade and geography.
By geography, financial development spreads through economic unions and through the
activities of common lenders to regional blocks. Through the activities of institutional investors
economic unions such as the EU can increase the level of financial development of its members
Cvetanovic (2006). Financial linkages could spread financial development either directly or
indirectly. Directly, financial linkages can take the form of establishment of foreign banks and
financial instructions. Indirectly, domestic lenders have the opportunity to learn the expertise
(such as the ability to distinguish good credit risks from bad credit risks) from these foreign
lenders and hence be in a better position to advance more credit. Competition with the foreign
banks for customers can also results in a higher level of financial development. Finally trade
liberalization and globalization leads to competition with the outside world making domestic
entrepreneurs put pressure on the financial sector for credit.
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Specifically the chapter finds which channel is more effective and more responsible for
the spread and growth of financial development in countries and shows that financial linkages
are the most effective channel followed by trade and geography respectively. This means that for
poor countries to attain the minimum requirement level of financial development needed for
growth convergence financial linkages will play very crucial role.
Chapter 4 investigates why Africa has not experienced contagion in the area of a lingua
franca (a common language used by speakers of different languages). Specifically it finds the
limitations to contagion in lingua franca in Africa posing the question whether ethno- linguistic
fractionalization and linguistic fractionalization are contagious and are perpetuated in Africa. It
attempts to answer why, unlike other countries and continents, no single language has spread
through the whole region of Africa. Further, the chapter finds possible explanations for the
situation of Africa and makes some policy recommendations based on the findings of the
chapter.
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Chapter 2
Currency Crises and Exchange Market Pressure – Contagion, Trade and Geography
2.1. Introduction
Contagion in currency crises has received much attention both theoretically and empirically. This
follows the increasing regional experience of currency crises around the world. For example, the
Russian Crisis of 1998 followed the Asian Crisis of 1997, which started with an attack on the
Thailand baht and spread to South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Also the
Mexican Crisis of 1994 was followed by the Latin America Tequila Crisis associated with
speculative attacks in countries including Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Thailand, Hong
Kong, Hungary, and the Philippines.
Economic contagion can be defined in different ways including the following as stated by
Edwards (2000): (1) global disturbances that affect most countries in the world; (2) shocks
coming from a related country; (3) a situation where the extent and magnitude of the
international transmission of shocks exceeds what was expected by market participants. The first
and second definitions are the ones considered for discussing contagion in this chapter.
Chiodo and Owyang (2002) define a currency crisis as a speculative attack on a country‟s
currency brought about by agents attempting to alter their portfolio by buying another currency
with the currency of the domestic country. There are three generations of currency crises.
Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984) and Dooley (1997) developed the first generation
models; Obstfeld (1994) developed the second generation models, and Krugman (1999) and
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000) developed the third generation models. Chiodo and
Owyang (2002) discovered four factors, namely domestic debt, pegged exchange rate,
expectations, and the state of financial markets, that cause and exacerbate currency crises.
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Pesenti and Tille (2000) also discuss some generations of currency crises and related
them to the Asian crises. In addition to what previous studies say about the first generations
model they state that even if a country does not run large fiscal deficits it can still experience
currency crises when financial difficulties necessitate government bailouts. They also explain
that chronic current account deficits make countries more vulnerable because of dependency on
foreign capital. Relating to the Asian crises, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore had low debts
and current account surpluses as opposed to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia and South Korea,
who had huge current account deficits in the 1990‟s.
The second generation model explains that geographic neighbors, trade partners and the
world‟s financial markets are responsible for the spread of currency crises. Pesenti and Tille
(2000) explain that when foreign investors expect devaluations, they will ask a high premium
which increases borrowing cost and limits credit opportunities and governments abandon the
peg. The third generation model explains that because the banks and the financial markets are
fragile, increases in interest rates make firms‟ default rate high, and this becomes a lending
constraint. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) explain the twin problem between the banking sector
and currency crises.
The contribution of this chapter is that it attempts to measure trade and geographic
channels of currency crises transmission separately as well as examine the effects of economic
fundamentals on currency crises (the extent to which economic fundamentals aggravate currency
crises in a country). Edwards (2000) employ VAR to investigate volatility contagion while
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and Glick and Rose (1999) employ probit models to
address contagion in currency crises. This is the first study that uses a spatial econometric model
to study contagion in currency crises. This model has the advantage of accounting for multi-
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directional effects as opposed to unidirectional effects captured in the conventional econometrics
models. In addition, it is also convenient for situations where spatial dependence exists in the
data.
This chapter produces evidence supporting the existing hypothesis that trade is
contagious in transmitting currency crises and or exchange market pressure from one country to
the other and that it does so to a larger extent than existing findings. Second, this chapter also
examines whether contagion is only crises phenomenon. It shows that there is contagion during
strong and stable currency periods, the impact through trade and geographic linkages is positive
and that trade linkages have a larger magnitude in this case than during currency crises. For
geography, the magnitude is same as during currency crises.
Also, this chapter examines whether macroeconomic channels are economically
significant in explaining currency crises or exchange market pressure. The findings suggest that
trade has been the dominant factor to which geography is next. These two channels explain why
during currency crises, some countries are infected while some are not. For example, it explains
why during the Asian Crisis in 1997-98 countries like Russia and some Asian countries lay pray
to the endemic crisis, but countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were not infected
even though they are in the same region. Or, why the Tequila Crisis in Latin America during
1994-95 infected other Latin American countries and Hungary but did not affect Chile?
This chapter poses the question, given that a country experiences currency crises or some
level of exchange market pressure, what percentage of it is attributable to trade channels or
geographic channels?
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In section 2, I present some theoretical explanations of the transmission mechanisms;
present my methodology in section 3 followed by my results and interpretation in section 4 and
conclusion in section 5.

2.2. Channels of Transmission
While all the three generations of currency crises agree on financial markets as a channel of
transmission and have also spelt out the macro-economic fundamentals that matter in explaining
currency crises, the second generation models of currency crises identify trade and geography in
particular as contagious channels. This chapter therefore explains three channels of contagion
namely geography, trade and financial markets.

2.2.1. Geography
Chiodo and Owyang (2002) pointed out some channels of transmission of currency crises
including common events affecting geographic neighbors. These events include wars or oil price
shocks or other events common to a geographical location that could affect the exchange markets
of countries located in that area. For example, when there is war in one or two West African
countries, this may lead not only to speculative attack on the currencies of the countries involved
but on the currencies of neighboring countries as well.
Moreover, countries in the same region tend to belong to economic unions and may be
easily infected by events from a member country. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000)
documented that if Mexico devalues and a diversified investor sells his equity and bond
holdings, he may do the same with respect to Argentina. This could be classified as a geographic
channel since it originates from the effect of a common factor (lender in this case) on that region.
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2.2.2. Trade
Another channel identified as a transmission mechanism of currency crises is trade. This trade
linkage may hold even if the countries involved do not engage in bilateral trade. Kaminsky and
Reinhart (2000), for example, proved that bilateral trade in itself has not been a major force
behind recent crises. They gave an example of the Asian Crisis, in which the bilateral trade
between the countries involved was relatively very small, to prove this. This finding,
notwithstanding, does not overrule the fact that bilateral trade may magnify the spread of
currency crises. This will happen when a trade partner devalues its currency and competition for
exports necessitates the other to do the same.
The most widely accepted trade channel is the competition for exports in a third country‟s
market by other countries. If one of these countries devalues, it is most likely to cause the others
to do the same. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), however, showed that it is not always so unless
the competitors are all exporting same products to this third market. A more general way to see
this will be a competition for exports (of all export goods produced by each country) in a global
market. Devaluation in some countries can increase their export or export growth and cause
countries that produce similar exports to devalue as well. With increasing globalization, the
effect of a global market may even be more pronounced as this covers competition for all export
goods and services. What is necessary here is same or similar export goods for the countries
involved.
Thus this trade linkage may work if there is a high bilateral trade between two countries,
one of which is experiencing a crisis, and or a competition (for exports) between countries hit by
currency crises and other countries in a third-party market (in this study global market) or both
trade forms.
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2.2.3. Financial Markets
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) examined two financial market channels. First, a common bank
creditor which serves as a regional block to other countries can transmit currency crises. This is
linked with trade as countries which engage in trade need strong financial market
interconnections and facilities. When this common creditor country is faced with huge
nonperforming loans in one country it may lend less in that country as well as the other customer
countries.
The second financial market channel has to do with mutual funds and cross-market
hedging in which globally diversified investors decide to sell their bond and equity holding of
one country as the other country (related by geography or some other common characteristic)
devalues its currency. For example, Baig and Ilan (1999) found evidence of cross-border
contagion in currency and equity markets.
Empirical investigation of this channel has posed a problem: mutual fund and cross
hedging were not in existence until the 90‟s. To address this, the chapter uses the trade channel
as a proxy for the financial markets channel. By national income accounting identities, trade
flows are equivalent to capital flows. In other words, trade in goods and services are equivalent
to trade in financial assets. Thus based on this identity, both channels should produce same
results.

2.3. Methodology
2.3.1. Model
This study uses spatial autoregressive model (SAR) and spatial error model (SEM). SAR
specifies a country‟s currency crisis as a function of the weighted value of the currency crises of
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it neighbors. SEM models the error term of a country‟s currency crisis as a function of the
weighted value of its geographic neighbors‟ currency crises. These are similar to the time series
ARMA and MA models except that they use distance lags rather than time lags. Anselin (1988),
Anselin and Moreno (2003) as well as LeSage and Pace (2004) explain these models extensively.
To use the above approach, I first test for the presence of spatial dependence using the
Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test which shows whether OLS estimates would be biased and also
helps chose the best spatial model (the one with the largest LM t-statistic) that can remove the
unobserved spatial dependence. I used both models in my analysis, but based on my tests, SEM
is best suited for all the regression even though the results for SAR are very close. I will provide
my results based on both.
These models are specified below:

SAR :
Yt    WYt  X t  t

(1)

SEM :
Yt    X t   t ;  t  W t  t

(2)

Or, for regressions that use lagged dependent variables,

Yt    X t  Yt 1   t ;  t  W t  t

(3)

where W is an NXN weight matrix with respect trade or geography; X t is a vector of controls
variables, Yt is an NX1 vector of measures of the dependent variables,  and  are the spatial
autoregressive and spatial error coefficients respectively (which represent the percentage of a
country‟s dependent variable accounted for by the dependent variable of its trade linkages or
geographic neighbors), and t and  t are NX1 matrixes of iid random errors.
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All of these models are run in MATLAB.

2.3.2. Measuring the Dependent Variables
My index of exchange market pressure (EMP), used to compute my dependent variables, is
constructed as a weighted average of reserve changes and exchange rate changes similar to the
way it is constructed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). I construct my index of EMP as below:

EMPit  [ (%eit )   (%rit  %rGit )]

(4)

where eit represents the price of a DM in country i ‟s currency at time t; rit is country i ‟s
international reserves, rGit is German international reserves and  and  are weights. My choice
of Germany as the center country follows the reasoning used in Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz
(1996); the currency of Germany had been strong throughout the post war era.
Based on the above I construct different measures of currency crisis and currency
stability. The conventional method is to find a benchmark EMP value and assign the currency
crisis a dummy when a country‟s EMP in a particular year exceeds this threshold EMP. I used
this index also in my analysis to help me compare my results with similar papers. Below is how
this dummy is defined:

1
Crisisi,t  
0

if EMPit  1.5 EMP   EMP
otherwise

(5)

16

where, EMP is the sample mean and  EMP is the sample standard deviation. One limitation I
realized with this index is that it does not tell much about the severity of the crisis, since it gives
the same value to all countries experiencing high EMP‟s. This can either overvalue or
undervalue the magnitude of the spread of currency crises. To make up for this, I expressed
currency crises in two ways: one as the actual excess EMP over the threshold and the other as the
excess as a percentage of the threshold as shown in equation 3 and 4 respectively. For EMP‟s
equal to or less than the threshold, the crises index is zero since that is an indication of low
exchange market pressure or stability.

Cisisit  EMPit  (1.5 EMP   EMP)
Cisisit 

(6)

[EMPit  (1.5 EMP   EMP)]
*100
(1.5 EMP   EMP)

(7)

Using just the excess EMP or equation (6) has not changed my results much, but I decide
to maintain the definition based on equation (7) above because it rationalizes the currency crisis
index both across years and across countries as each index is not just a deviation from the
threshold but also the percentage deviation from the threshold. Only years with currency crises
of five or more, based on this measure, were studied. This is because Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz (1996) found that contagion is not likely to take effect when just one or a few
speculative attacks have occurred. My crisis years are thus, 2003, 2001, 1998, 1992, 1990, 1988
and 1987. For simplicity and comparison I used same years for regressions using other
dependent variables in this study.
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I also construct a currency stability index as another dependent variable in addition to
exchange market pressure and currency crises. For every country for which the excess EMP over
the threshold is negative, I interpret it as a stable and strong currency. Since the closer an EMP is
to the threshold means it is closer to crisis than a stability, larger negative deviations mean a
more stable and stronger currency than smaller negative deviations. As a result I used the same
measure as above but took the absolute value. For example, two countries with excess EMP as a
percentage of the threshold as -5 and -10 will now have stability measures as 5 and 10
respectively. For EMP equal to or greater than the threshold, the stability index is zero since that
is an indication of high exchange market pressure or crises. In similar notation as above,

Stabilityit  EMPit  (1.5 EMP   EMP)

Stabilityit 

(8)

[ EMPit  (1.5 EMP   EMP]
*100
(1.5 EMP   EMP)

(9)

2.3.3. Constructing the Weight Matrices
The weight matrix for the geographic channel is based on first order contiguity. A country will
only give a positive weight to another country if it is its neighbor, otherwise a zero weight. The
spatial weight given by a country to its neighbor is expressed as the inverse of the total number
of neighbors the country has based on first-order contiguity (usually referred to as the “queen
case” in spatial econometrics). The weights are row-standardized for each of the countries so that
each country‟s total weight given equals 1. This is represented in matrix notations below:
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 1 j

  1 j
 .
W2   .
 .
 
 nj
   nj

.

.

.

.
.
.
.

.

1
0

.

1 j 

 1 j 




n j 

 nj 
.
.
.

j =1, 2, ….n.

if country i and j are neighbors
otherwise

i j  

(10)

(11)

The trade weight matrix must capture the theoretical explanation of trade linkages. This
should reflect competition for exports between countries that engage in bilateral trade and or
competition of countries for exports in third country‟s market or the global market. The idea is
that if any of these competitors suffers from currency crises (or has a strong currency), it can
easily spillover to other competitors. As a result, my first trade weight matrix uses bilateral
export between countries as in Leeson and Sobel (2006). In this case, country A gives a weight
equal to the ratio of his export to each country to its total exports. In matrix form,

 X 11
 X
 1j
 .
W1   .
 .
 X nj

  X nj

.

.

.

.
.
.
.

.

.

X1 j 
 X1 j 
. 
. 
. 
X nn 

 X nj 

for j =1, 2, ….n.

(12)

where X i, j is country i ‟s export to country j . Since a country cannot send exports to itself, the
principal diagonal is zero.
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The above matrix is however not enough to capture the trade weight since countries
which do not engage in bilateral trade may still be infected by currency crises in non-trade
partner countries. I therefore construct another weight matrix in which a country would assign a
weight to other countries based on the magnitude and growth rate differential of their export
shares of GDP and merged it with the above.
For this weight matrix, country i finds the difference between its export share of GDP or
growth rate of export share of GDP and gives a weight directly corresponding to this difference
to all countries for which this value is positive. Otherwise, country i gives a weight
corresponding to the inverse of the absolute value of this value. This is represented in matrix
notation below:

 X1  X1
 (X  X )
1
 i
X

X

1
2
 ( X i  X 2 )
W2  
.


.
 X X
1
n

  ( X i  X n )

X 2  X1
( X i  X1 )
X2  X2
( X i  X 2 )
.
.
X2  Xn
( X i  X n )

.

.

.

.

.
.
.

.

X n  X1 
( X i  X1 ) 
Xn  X2 
( X i  X 2 )  for i =1, 2..n
.


.
Xn  Xn 

( X i  X n ) 

(11)

where X i can either be interpreted as a country‟s export share of GDP or the growth rate of the
country‟s export share of GDP. Exports shares account for the size of countries economy which
is important in determining competition for exports between countries.
Let X i  X j  dij , so that X1  X1  d11 and

( X

Then for
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i

 X j )   dij

Xi  X j  0
d ij  X i  X j
And for

Xi  X j  0
1

d ij  X i  X j ; X i  X j
Thus this weight matrix rules out the possibility of two countries having exactly the
same export share of GDP. It is only on the principal diagonal that we must have zeroes since
each country's exports share of GDP deviation with respect to itself is zero ( dii  0 ). This
simplifies the above weight matrix to:

 d11
 d
  i1
 d12
 d
W2    i 2
 .
 .
 d
 1n
  d in

d 21
 di1
d 22
 di 2
.
.
d 2n
 din

.

.

.

.

.
.
.

.

d n1 
 di1 
d n2 
 di 2 
. 
. 
d nn 

 din 

for i =1, 2, …n

For all countries country i ‟s export share of GDP (or growth rate of) is smaller than, it
will give them a weight directly related to these deviations. On the other hand for all countries
country i ‟s export share of GDP or growth rate of export share of GDP is higher than, the
deviation will be negative and hence country i will give them a weight that equals the inverse of
the absolute value of the deviation. This ensures that all countries with positive deviations have
higher weights than those with negative deviations with respect to country i .
The final trade weight matrix takes the following forms:
1. W2 , using export share of GDP
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2. W2 , using growth rate of export share of GDP
3. A linear combination of W2 in (1) above with W1
4. A linear combination of W2 in (2) above with W1
This chapter uses all the different combinations above for robustness and also tests W1 to see if
bilateral trade alone is a sufficient trade channel for contagion.

2.3.4. Independent Variables
In line with the theoretical framework and based on availability of data for the sample chosen,
the following control variables are employed. They are mostly domestic fundamentals including
the current account as a share of GDP, growth rate of domestic credit, the CPI, real GDP growth
rate, money stock (M2) and unemployment rate. The choice of these independent variables is
based on the theoretical framework explained earlier. All these variables were included as
deviations from German values as it is the center country.

2.3.5. Data
The study covers a period of twenty years from 1985 to 2005. The choice of this period is a
result of the bandwagon of currency crises that hit the world in recent years especially the
1990‟s. Starting from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism collapse between 1992 and 1993
to the Asian crisis and the Russian default in 1998, there are many cases to consider within the
period under study. A panel of 119 countries is chosen for this study.
Data is taken from different sources including the World Bank Databases (World
Development Indicator), the IMF databases (IFS and DOS) and the World Fact Book. Detailed
description of the data is in Appendix 1.
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2.4. Results
My results confirm the existing theoretical framework suggesting that trade and geography are
the transmission mechanisms of currency crises. The findings also support the hypothesis that
trade is the most dominant channel of contagion in currency crises. Furthermore, my results
suggest that currency stabilities in countries can also propagate to other countries through the
same trade links in a higher magnitude than does currency crises. The magnitude of the spread
through geography though is the same for currency crises and currency stabilities in this study.
Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) is also found to be contagious through geography and
trade links. I present my results in Table 1.1 – Table 1.6 (Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 provide results
for robustness checks using different dependent variables). Though I run the regression for both
models, based on my LM test SEM results are best for this analysis except for the dummy
dependent variables which uses SAR.
The results suggest that country‟s catch 0.24 of their EMP from their geographic
neighbors. This is shown as lambda in Table 1.1, column 3, and it is significant at 1%. The trade
channel nevertheless is of a much higher magnitude; 0.35. This is also found in column 6
(column 7 reports similar result using a different weight matrix for robustness checks) of Table
1.1. The lagged level of EMP is not significant in all of the regressions, meaning that exchange
market pressure can produce surprising shocks. A country with a low EMP the previous period
can suddenly have a high EMP in the current period.
Table 1.2 presents the results for currency crisis. The study shows that countries catch
0.15 of their currency crisis from geographic neighbors (shown as lambda in column 3). For
trade, this coefficient is between 0.14-0.17 depending on the trade weight matrix used (shown as
lambda in column 6 and 7). This means that trade linkages are more important than geographic
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measures in explaining contagion in currency crises. The measure of currency crisis used here
was based on equation (4). The results for a similar measure, based on equation (3) are also
reported in Table 1. 4 for robustness checks.
The results for the measures of currency stability are quite interesting. Lambda is larger
for both trade and geography regressions than it is for the measures of currency crisis. Table 1.3
presents the results of currency stability. For both measures of currency stability, lambda for the
geography regression is 0.17. This is found in column 3 of Table 1.3 and Table 1.5. It implies
that countries catch 0.17 of the strength of the currency of their geographic neighbors. For the
trade regression, lambda is between 0.45-0.49 using the measure based on equation (5). This can
be found in column 6 and 7 of Table 1.3. The results for a similar measure, based on equation
(5), are also reported in Table 1.5 for robustness checks.
Also, the result for the geographic channel and its lower magnitude than the trade channel
is intuitive; when the trade effect becomes very large it can be enough to spread currency crises
regardless of distance (for example the Russian default linked to the Asian Crisis and the Tequila
Crisis infecting Hungary), but the combination of the geography effect and the trade effect
produces a synergy that makes currency crises regional. That geographic channel alone is less
strong and perhaps not enough could help answer questions like why during the Asian Crisis
countries like Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia were not infected or why during the Tequila
Crisis Chile was not infected. Sometimes the trade effect between two distant countries could be
bigger than the amalgamation of the trade and geography effects for two neighbors though the
opposite is more prevalent as in current episodes.
All results are robust using different measures of dependent variables as well as different
weight matrices for trade. The regression is also run for each of the years chosen for the study
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and results for 1998, for example, are as follows: geography is accountable for 0.19 of a currency
crisis, 0.14 of currency stability, and 0.17 of an exchange market pressure while trade is
accountable for 0.35 of currency stability. All these results are significant at 5%, 10%, 5%, and
1% respectively.
However compared to former studies, especially Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996),
who studied currency crises, trade linkages and macroeconomic channels, my results differ
significantly using my measure of currency crisis but similar to theirs when dummy variables are
used as in those studies. Table 1.6 shows the result when dummy variables were used for the
measures based on equation (2). Rho, shown in column 4 is 0.053 for currency crisis which is
close to the 0.08 produced by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996). Second, using this
measure of currency crisis confirms my results above even though rho is just higher for this new
measure. The results in Table 1.4 show that countries catch 0.07 of the currency crisis of their
geographic neighbors and 0.13 of the currency stability of their geographic neighbors. The
results are 0.053 and 0.31 respectively by trade partners and trade competitors. These are shown
as rho in columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively.
Comparing the trade linkages for currency crises and currency stabilities it is obvious that
the later is of a higher magnitude than the former; almost three times larger (0.49 against 0.17).
An obvious reason why the magnitude of the contagion is so high for the currency stability
measure is that for countries trading with each other or competing in a third market for exports,
one cannot decide to consistently devalue its currency when the currency of the others are strong
due to the fear of potential retaliation and or a direct pressure exerted by these trading
competitors to allow its currency to appreciate for a fair competition. For example, China
receives increasing pressure from the U.S. in the form of calls for import barriers to allow the
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yuan to appreciate as explained by Bown, Crowley, McCulloch, and Nakajima (2005). Currency
crises, on the other hand, spread by indirect competition and have lower magnitude than the
former.
Moreover, I have examined if bilateral trade alone is sufficient for contagion and found
no such evidence. By using the bilateral trade weight matrix alone, no lambda in all regressions
is significant. This finding is consistent with the claim of Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) that
bilateral trade has not been a force behind recent crises. Lambda is significant when the weight
matrices based on competition in a third-party market (global market) are used and most times
higher when this weight is combined with the bilateral trade weight. This means that bilateral
trade is neither necessary nor sufficient for contagion but can increase its magnitude.
This chapter does not investigate into how macroeconomic variables spread currency
crises but used them as control variables to find out how they can affect a country‟s own
currency crisis. For all of my macroeconomic variables controlled for, apart from unemployment
(the coefficient of unemployment was 6% in all regressions in Table 1.1, but became 1% in
Table 1.6 when dummy dependent variables are used), this chapter found some statistically but
not economically significant as found by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996).
On the other hand, the divergence in magnitude of my trade results from those by
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and other empirical studies may largely be because my
crisis measures account, not only for the existence of currency crisis but, also for its relative
intensity as opposed to previous studies. Second, my trade weight matrix captures not only
exports but also accounts for the size of a country‟s economy (GDP) as well the growth rate of
exports. Furthermore, the spatial econometrics technique used accounts for multi-directional
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effects as opposed to the conventional econometric models and it is also convenient for studying
contagion of this kind, where spatial dependence exists in the data.

2.5. Conclusion
This chapter attempted to study contagion in currency crises and exchange market pressure by
incorporating the geography weight matrix and also introducing a new dependent variable,
currency stabilities, to the already existing empirical work. The results both confirm and improve
upon the former studies in this area of study.
The chapter suggests that geographic measures are also very significant and are captured
by certain unmeasured common shocks that are identified only with countries in a certain
geographical location. It also explains that while the summation of geographic and trade
channels of currency crises are responsible for the contagion in certain regions (which accounts
for why larger percentage of the infection is regional), the high magnitude of the trade channel
accounts for the spread of currency crises to other trade competitors outside the geographic
location of the initial attack.
Second, though trade spreads currency crises, the positive effect it has during periods of
currency stabilities are much larger (about three times more) than the adverse effects during
crises. This may imply that the overall global effect of the trade linkages is not a zero sum or
decreasing sum game but an increasing sum game.
For policy recommendation, this would suggest that trade should be encouraged as
countries come to learn this findings. For geography, since countries cannot choose their
neighbors, the only thing to do is to realize that what happens in the exchange market “next
door” can affect you and hence the need to be prepared for it. One way to do this is to encourage
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strong economic unions that could help deal with such common adverse or favorable events as
well as other unmeasured common shocks that hit the currency markets of regions around the
world.
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Table 1.1. Contagion- Exchange Market Pressure
Geography
Dependent Variable
Exchange Market
Pressure (EMP)

Trade
TradeVariable
Dependent
Exchange Market Pressure
(EMP)
SAR

Independent
Variable
Constant

SAR

SEM

Export growth
and bilateral
trade weight

Exports and
bilateral trade
weight

SEM
Export
growth and
Exports and
bilateral trade bilateral
weight
trade weight

-3.15
(0.670)

2.24
(-0.42.)

-3.44
(-0.611)

-3.436
(-0.631)

-3.174
(-0.572)

-5.820
(-1.034)

…

0.243***
(11.77)

…

…

0.353***
(4.906)

0.398***
(4.776)

Rho

0.236***
(11.5)

…

0.322***
(4.26)

0.375***
(5.333)

…

…

Lagged
EMP

-0.010
(0.72)

0.007
(0.21)

-0.003
(-0.089)

-0.003
(-0.097)

0.013
(.370)

0.011
(0.323)

Current Account
per GDP
(annual %)
Domestic Credit
per GDP growth
(annual %)
M2 – money and
quasi money to
total reserve ratio

0.113
(0.862)

0.113
(0.812)

0.147
(1.063)

0.181
(1.311)

0.204
(1.44)

0.184
(1.316)

0.004
(0.364)

0.003
(0.314)

0.004
(0.451)

0.004
(0.444)

0.004
(0.422)

0.004
(0.376)

0.042**
(2.289)

0.045***
(2.476)

0.042***
(2.246)

0.041**
(2.200)

0.043***
(2.294)

0.0421**
(2.237)

CPI (annual %)

-0.006***
(-3.855)

-0.006***
(-3.789)

-0.006***
(-3.600)

-0.006***
(-3.549)

-0.006***
(-3.419)

-0.006***
(-3.460)

GDP growth
(annual %)

0.303***
(2.252)

0.323**
(2.334)

0.249***
(1.795)

0.258**
(1.888)

0.243***
(1.749)

0.252**
(1.781)

Unemployment
(annual %)

0.152
(0.913)

0.180
(1.067)

0.125
(0.739)

0.154
(0.909)

0.173
(1.012)

0.170
(0.995)

Regional
Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Va
Lambda

-0.60
-1.588
-0.857
-1.158
-1.294
-1.049
Island
(-0.20)
(-0.514)
(-0.281)
(-0.379)
(-0.426)
(-0.346)
Observations
119
119
119
119
119
119
R-squared
0.081
0.151
0.078
0.078
0.114
0.114
Log-likelihood
-3532.483 -3531.677
-3544.887
-3544.898
-3543.343
-3544.407
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1.
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Table 1.2. Contagion- Currency Crisis
Geography
Dependent Variable
Currency Crisis
(% excess EMP)

Trade
TradeVariable
Dependent
Currency Crisis
(% excess EMP)
SAR

Independent
Variable
Constant
Va
Lambda

Rho

SAR

SEM

Export growth
and bilateral
trade weight

Exports and
bilateral trade
weight

-0.134
(0.044)

-0.138
(-0.045)

-0.139
(-0.045)

-0.267
(-0.086)

…

0.151***
(9.682)

…

…

SEM
Export growth Exports
and bilateral
and
trade weight
bilateral
trade
weight
0.321
0.310
(0.103)
(0.100)
0.141***
(4.035)

0.167***
(2.452)

0.143***
(9.402)

…

0.146***
(4.26)

0.166***
(2.471)

…

…

…

…

...

…

…

…

0.021
(0.279)

0.021
(0.262)

0.028
(0.361)

0.024
(0.314)

0.027
(0.354)

0.026
(0.340)

-0.0003
(-0.055)

-0.0004
(-0.089)

-0.0004
(-0.077)

-0.001
(-0.090)

-0.0004
(-0.082)

0.001
(-0.087)

0.021**
(2.065)

0.021**
(2.073)

0.022***
(2.039)

0.022**
(2.066)

0.022***
(2.044)

0.022**
(2.049)

CPI (annual %)

-0.0001
(-0.063)

-0.0001
(-0.072)

-0.0001
(-0.079)

-0.0001
(-0.084)

-0.0001
(-0.099)

-0.0001
(-0.083)

GDP growth
(annual %)

0.0208
(0.271)

0.019
(0.249)

0.005
(0.042)

0.003
(0.041)

0.003
(0.042)

0.006
(0.074)

Unemployment
(annual %)

0.175*
(1.839)

0.175*
(1.821)

0.175*
(1.825)

0.175*
(1.827)

0.175*
(1.818)

0.176*
(1.837)

Regional
Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Lagged
Crises
Current Account
per GDP
(annual %)
Domestic Credit
per GDP growth
(annual %)
M2 – money and
quasi money to
total reserve ratio

-1.248
-1.621
-1.432
-1.158
-1.294
-1.443
Island
(-0.730)
(-0.930)
(-0.830)
(-0.379)
(-.426)
(-0.838)
Observations
119
119
119
119
119
119
R-squared
0.024
0.053
0.026
0.078
0.031
0.114
Log-likelihood
-3061.872 -3061.244 -3067.801
-3544.898
-3068.015
-3544.407
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1.
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Table 1.3. Contagion- Currency Stability
Geography
Dependent Variable
Currency Stability
(% shortfall EMP)

SAR
Export growth
Exports and
and bilateral
bilateral trade
trade weight
weight

Independent
Variable
Constant

Trade
TradeVariable
Dependent
Currency Stability
(% shortfall EMP)

SAR

SEM

SEM
Exports
Export growth
and
and bilateral
bilateral
trade weight
trade
weight
98.666***
93.410
(6.167)
(5.877)

83.552
(5.317)

97.033***
(6.233)

58.280***
(3.558)

48.339***
(8.784)

…

0.165***
(4.681)

…

…

0.454***
(6.180)

0.489***
(6.821)

0.176***
(5.113)

…

0.455***
(6.620)

0.522***
(3.592)

…

…

..

..

...

…

…

…

-0.429
(-1.105)

-0.458
(-1.149)

-0.436
(-1.136)

-0.760***
(-2.039)

-0.702*
(-1.775)

-0.745***
(-1.904)

-0.0169
(-0.597)

-0.017
(-0.616)

-0.019
(-0.711)

-0.020
(-0.729)

-0.020
(-0.715)

-0.018
(-0.667)

0.042
(0.799)

0.028
(0.537)

0.0344
(0.660)

0.052
(1.010)

0.043
(0.822)

0.051
(0.987)

CPI (annual %)

0.019***
(4.064)

0.019***
(4.011)

0.019***
(4.035)

0.018***
(3.961)

0.018***
(3.932)

0.018***
(3.969)

GDP growth
(annual %)

0.103
(0.266)

0.085
(0.215)

0.333
(0.868)

0.274
(0.728)

0.466
(1.197)

0.356
(0.901)

Unemployment
(annual %)

1.467***
(3.074)

1.446***
(2.964)

1.546***
(3.281)

1.367***
(2.940)

1.401* **
(2.931)

1.340***
(2.814)

Regional Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Va
Lambda

Rho
Lagged
Crises
Current Account
per GDP
(annual %)
Domestic
Credit
per GDP growth
(annual %)
M2 – money and
quasi money
to
total reserve ratio

9.520
-1.874
-3.799
-2.209
-1.009
-0.724
Island
(1.066)
(-0.212)
(-0.446)
(-0.262)
(-0.118)
(-0.086)
Observations
119
119
119
119
119
119
R-squared
0.139
0.162
0.132
0.141
0.185
0.191
Log-likelihood
-4410.159 -4412.832 -4401.9933
-4396.5019
-4403.8768
-4401.0794
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1.
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Table 1.4. Contagion- Currency Crisis (robust)
Geography
Dependent Variable
Currency Crisis
( excess EMP)

Trade
TradeVariable
Dependent
Currency Crisis
(excess EMP)
SAR

SEM

SAR

SEM

-0.012
(-0.012)

-0.002
(-0.001)

-0.008
(-0.008)

-0.030
(-0.029)

0.147
(0.141)

Exports
and
bilateral
trade
weight
0.170
(0.163)

…

0.189***
(10.571)

…

…

0.144***
(4.075)

0.170***
(2.532)

Rho

0.174***
(4.934)

…

0.147***
(4.064)

0.174***
(2.611)

…

…

Lagged
Crises
Current Account
per GDP
(annual %)
Domestic
Credit
per GDP growth
(annual %)
M2 – money and
quasi money
to
total reserve ratio

…

…

...

…

…

…

0.010
(0.387)

0.010
(0.380)

0.012
(0.467)

0.011
(0.467)

-0.0001
(-0.075)

0.012
(0.436)

-0.0001
(-0.048)

-0.0001
(-0.087)

-0.0001
(-0.069)

-0.0002
(-0.084)

-0.0001
(-0.075)

-0.0001
(-0.079)

0.009***
(2.541)

0.009***
(2.554)

0.009***
(2.502)

0.009**
(2.526)

0.009***
(2.503)

0.009***
(2.504)

CPI (annual %)

-0.00003
(-0.098)

-0.00003
(-0.101)

-0.0001
(-0.079)

-0.00004
(-0.134)

-0.00005
(-0.147)

-0.0004
(-0.133)

GDP growth
(annual %)

0.001
(0.038)

0.001
(0.249)

-0.005
(-0.174)

-0.006
(-0.218)

-0.006
(-0.211)

-0.005
(-0.172)

Unemployment
(annual %)

0.058*
(1.842)

0.059*
(1.823)

0.058*
(1.794)

0.058*
(1.805)

0.057*
(1.784)

0.059*
(1.812)

Regional Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Independent
Variable
Constant
Va
Lambda

Export growth
and bilateral
trade weight

Exports and
bilateral trade
weight

Export growth
and bilateral
trade weight

-0.501
-0.661
-0.604
-0.600
-0.587
-0.593
Island
(-0.873)
(-1.127)
(-1.038)
(-1.033)
(-1.009)
(-1.024)
Observations
119
119
119
119
119
119
R-squared
0.024
0.066
0.026
0.025
0.031
0.035
Log-likelihood
-2152.590 -2151.780 -3067.801
-2160.222
-3068.015
-2160.315
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1.
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Table 1.5. Contagion- Currency Stability(robust)
Geography
Dependent Variable
Currency Stability
(EMP shortfall)

Trade
TradeVariable
Dependent
Currency Stability
(EMP shortfall)
SAR

Independent
Variable
Constant

SAR

SEM

Export growth
and bilateral
trade weight

Exports and
bilateral trade
weight

SEM
Exports
Export growth
and
and bilateral
bilateral
trade weight
trade
weight
14.820***
13.619***
(2.703)
(2.443)

9.869*
(1.806)

14.123**
(2.614)

4.244
(0.860)

0.396
(0.069)

…

0.165***
(4.647)

…

…

0.382***
(5.167)

0.507***
(6.738)

Rho

0.171***
(4.935)

…

0.384***
(4.894)

0.508***
(6.881)

…

…

Lagged Crises

..

..

...

…

…

…

Current Account
per GDP
(annual %)
Domestic
Credit
per GDP growth
(annual %)
M2 – money and
quasi money
to
total reserve ratio

-0.184
(1.348)

-0.196
(-1.405)

-0.175
(-1.29)

-0.278**
(-2.069)

-0.254*
(-1.829)

-0.310**
(-2.258)

0.004
(0.419)

0.004
(0.401)

0.003
(0.298)

0.003
(0.324)

0.003
(0.282)

0.004
(0.360)

0.035*
(1.905)

0.032
(.736)

0.0301*
(1.666)

0.037**
(2.056)

0.033*
(1.788)

0.036**
(1.982)

CPI (annual %)

0.019***
(4.011)

0.003*
(1.724)

0.003
(1.57)

0.003*
(1.780)

0.003*
(1.635)

0.003*
(1.871)

GDP growth
(annual %)

0.129
(0.948)

0.112
(0.805)

0.105
(0.786)

0.105
(0.786)

0.228*
(1.677)

0.135
(0.968)

Unemployment
(annual %)

0.147
(0.881)

0.099
(0.581)

0.105
(0.636)

0.105
(0.636)

0.119
(0.712)

0.064
(0.381)

Regional Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Va
Lambda

0.777
-2.852
-3.799
-3.679
-3.716
-3.717
Island
(0.246)
(-0.920)
(-0.446)
(-1.238)
(-1.240)
(-1.260)
Observations
119
119
119
119
119
119
R-squared
0.100
0.126
0.077
0.095
0.138
0.153
Log-likelihood
-3536.582 -3538.811 -3532.869
-3526.800
--3533.406
-3528.421
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1.
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Table 1.6. Contagion - Using Dummy Dependent Variables
Geography
Dependent Variable
Currency
Currency
Crisis
Stability

Trade
TradeVariable
Dependent
Trade
Currency
Currency
Crisis
Stability

SAR- Exports and
bilateral trade weight

SAR- Exports
and bilateral trade
weight

0.160**
(2.055)

0.537***
(5.167)

…

0.711***
(8.500)
(Dummies)
…

…

…

Rho

0.066***
(6.540)

0.126***
(3.852)

0.053***
(3.404)

0.308***
(4.107)

LaggedCrises
Current Account
per GDP
(annual %)
Domestic Credit
per GDP growth
(annual %)

…

…

…

…

0.003*
(1.679)

0.003*
(-1.556)

0.003*
(1.722)

-0.004*
(-1.879)

0.00002
(0.199)

-0.00003
(-0.199)

0.00003
(0.201)

-0.00003
(-0.176)

M2 – money and
quasi money to
total reserve ratio

-0.00006
(-0.229)

0.0002
(0.881)

-0.00006
(-0.233)

0.0002
(0.728)

CPI (annual %)

-0.00002
(-0.844)

0.00003
(1.271)

-0.00002
(-0.867)

0.00003
(1.315)

GDP growth
(annual %)

-0.008***
(-4.304)

0.012***
(6.169)

-0.009***
(-4.424)

0.012***
(6.420)

Unemployment
(annual %)

-0.010***
(-4.225)

0.011***
(4.615)

-0.010***
(-4.275)

0.011***
(4.615)

Regional
Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-0.017
(-0.402)

0.133 ***
(2.761)

-0.026
(-0.601)

0.049
(1.153)

Independent
Variable
Constant
Va
Lambda

Island

SAR
0.159**
(2.051)

SAR

Observations
119
119
119
119
R-squared
0.090
0.126
0.089
0.131
Log-likelihood
-0.45343073
6.4585471
-1.643789
7.4175162
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1.
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Chapter 3
The Spread of Financial Development
3.1. Introduction
The increased focus on financial development (a measure of the credit advanced to the private
sector in a country) in both the development and finance literature comes mainly from its
believed role in promoting economic growth during the recent trend towards globalization. For
example, high risks of expropriation and thus insecure property rights limit financial
development and the ability of a country to take advantage of financial globalization. Moreover,
financial development is one of the prerequisites for a country to realize the full growth potential
of FDI. Domestic banking development is one of the important requirements in exploiting
growth opportunities. (Stulz, 2005; Hermes and Lensink, 1999; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and
Siegel, 2007).
There is a positive relationship between private sector enforcement, financial
development and investment and growth. It is also documented that the effect of liberalization on
economic growth is greater if a country starts from above average level of financial
development. Researchers have empirically shown evidence supporting the Schumpeterian
theory of convergence that countries with a certain critical level of financial development have a
likelihood of converging to the world–technology frontier and that other countries have far lower
long-run growth. (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad,
2005; Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Fulkes, 2003).
The foregoing literature has many implications, including but not limited to the
following: as countries make every possible effort to converge to the world‟s technological
frontier, for the convergence theory to hold, countries need to attain a certain threshold of
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financial development; governments of countries may need to booster domestic investment by
encouraging both actual and potential entrepreneurs to secure the necessary funds needed for
such ventures; globalization can lead to competition between domestic and foreign lenders for
customers (potential and actual entrepreneurs and investors). The first two points listed above
begs the question how do countries attain the necessary level of financial development? While a
few papers such as Koubi (2008) have addressed issues like the determinants of financial
development, no paper has examined whether financial development is contagious.
This chapter tests whether the amount of private credit being advanced to the private
sector in one country depends on what is prevailing in the private credit markets of other
countries. Second, it attempts to find out what the transmission mechanisms are and what the
magnitude of the contagion is in each case. This chapter therefore examines how countries attain
the necessary level of financial development needed for growth convergence. It identifies three
channels of contagion in financial development namely financial linkages, trade and geography.
My results suggest that each of these is a significant channel through which financial
development can spread from one country to the other. Specifically, it finds which channel is
more effective and more responsible for the spread and growth of financial development in
countries. Whiles no single channel seem to be the sole means of transmission, my results show
that Financial linkages are a more effective means followed closely by trade and geography. In
section 2, I shortly explain each of these channels; section 3 expatiates on the methodology and
data followed by presentation of my results and conclusion in sections 4 and 5 respectively
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3.2. Transmission Mechanisms of Financial Development
3.2.1. Geography as a channel of Financial Development
The geographic spread of financial development is fostered by economic unions and the
activities of a common lender to a regional block.
One way financial development can spread by geography is through economic unions.
Through economic unions like NAFTA or the EU, financial development can spread to member
countries which join such unions. Cvetanovic (2006) shows how the EU can, for example,
contribute to the financial development of the eight former-Socialist European accession (EU-8)
countries that joined it. The paper argues that through the activities of institutional investors
(domestic and foreign) such as insurance companies, mutual funds and private pension funds
there will be liquidity boost in terms of share of turnover in the market and a reduction in the
cost of capital, which would make it easier for liquidity-constrained firms in the union to obtain
fresh capital infusion.
Finally, a regional block having a common lender can experience similar financial
development, especially changes of financial development in their geographical location.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) explain that when a common creditor country has nonperforming
loans in one of its customer countries in a regional block it may chose to reduce or withdraw its
credit advances to the country involved as well as customer countries in the entire block. This
was what happened during the Asian crisis when Japan happened to be a common lender to most
of the Asian countries.
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3.2.2. Trade as a channel of Financial Development
Trade is another major way financial development can spread. Rajan and Zingales (2003a,
2003b) show that financial development is associated with trade liberalization. They document
that “periods when and countries where borders were open to foreign trade and capital coincided
with periods of intense financial development. This is true even controlling for endogeneity of
the decision to open up borders”. According to their findings, even though special interest groups
could have strong motives to hinder the development of a good financial sector, openness to
international trade and capital flows could mitigate these incentives.
Second, trade openness leads to increased competition from foreigners. To be able to
compete with foreign countries, especially more developed countries, poorer countries need to
attain a certain critical level of financial development and would enforce financial development.
Firms and entrepreneurs would put pressure on their governments to make legislations that
would make financial development thrive to enable them compete in the global marketplace.

3.2.3. Financial linkages as a channel of Financial Development
Financial linkages between countries can also have spillover effects on countries‟ level of
financial development. In other words, a country that has financial linkages with other countries
with different levels of financial development will have its financial sector affected differently
by each of those countries.
For example, the spillover effects of FDI have been explored by many researchers.
Lipsey (2000) shows that there has been an increased capital formation in Canada as a result of
FDI inflows. Also, Dutta and Roy (forthcoming) find that FDI has positive spillover effects on
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a country‟s institutional framework. They document that not only will FDI bring technology
spillovers into a country but that it also ensures better corporate governance, efficient laws, better
legal environments and financial comfort (FDI1 is thus used to weigh financial linkages in this
study). Financial development, being also a formal institution, is therefore liable to receiving this
positive spillover either directly or indirectly.
Financial linkages can either be direct or indirect. Directly, financial linkages can be in
the form of private credit unions or financial institutions established by foreign firms (primarily
for their employees), which can eventually help in establishing financial development in the
domestic countries. Indirectly, it could also go beyond this point to have a ripple effect through
competition, learning, and motivation. First, domestic private lenders would compete with
foreign credit unions or financial institutions that have better credit risk and monitoring
expertise. In order not to lose customers (borrowers) to these firms they would seek a better
system that will enable them to efficiently advance credit.
Second, domestic lenders also have the opportunity to learn the expertise (such as the
ability to distinguish good credit risks from bad credit risks) from these foreign lenders and
hence be in a better position to advance more credit to the private sector.

3.3. Data and Methodology
3.3.1. Dependent Variables
For the purpose of this chapter, I consider three measures of financial development namely
domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, private credit by the banking sector
as a percentage of GDP, and stock market total value traded as a percentage of GDP.

1

While there apparently are causality issues between FDI and financial development especially at low levels of
financial development (Rioja and Valev 2004), this paper just uses FDI to construct a weight matrix to proxy for
financial linkages and does not use FDI itself as an explanatory variable.
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The first two measure domestic banking development and banking development respectively.
Domestic credit to the private sector includes credit from all domestic sources (private and
public) to the private sector. Private credit banking sector includes credit from all commercial
banks from home and abroad. The last one relates to stock market liquidity and measures stock
market development. Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP is used for the
main analysis while the rest two measure domestic banking development and banking
development respectively while the last one relates to stock market liquidity and measures stock
market development. Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP is used for the
main analysis while the rest are for robustness checks.
In addition to a specification estimating the level of financial development level, I will
also consider a specification using change of financial development. This change specification
examines whether credit freezes or other shocks are also contagious. Data is from 1985-2000.
The data for financial development comes from World Development Indicator (WDI). Data
descriptions and statistics are found in appendix 3.

3.3.2. Independent Variables
The independent variables used in this study include initial GDP per-capita, the lagged level of
financial development, spatial weight matrixes and regional or continent dummies. Lagged levels
of countries‟ financial development are included to examine if there is any evidence of
institutional dependence; that is if previous levels of financial development affect the present.
Data for these variables is also taken from the World Development Indicator Series Data (WDI).
Other variables are the indexes of bureaucratic quality, the risk of expropriation of private
investment, the risk of repudiation of contracts by governments and legal environment, which is
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the summation of the last two indicators. Higher values of the bureaucratic quality index indicate
that bureaucratic delays are low or the bureaucratic structure of the country is high. High values
of the risk of expropriation index, the risk of repudiation of contracts and hence the legal
environment means that it is safer to transact business in such a country. In other words,
governments are not likely to confiscate private investment or inadvertently alter contracts or
arbitrarily change business agreements with foreign investors. Data for these measures are taken
from the ICRG dataset.
For the measures of geography I collect data on nearest neighbors from the World Fact
Book. The trade data is taken from the IFS Direction of Trade databases. FDI data comes from
the OECD data base on the bilateral FDI inflows from countries. The FDI data comprises of only
data on the OECD countries due to unavailability of data; only the OECD countries provide data
on FDI inflows from other countries and hence the weight matrix can only be constructed for
these countries. The full sample however comprises of a panel of 98 countries for the geography
regression and the trade regression and a panel of 30 countries for the FDI regression. Five years
averages are computed and used for panel regressions.

3.3.3. Methodology
This study uses spatial econometric methods to examine the spread of financial development. I
will use both a spatial autoregressive model (SAR) and spatial error model (SEM). SAR
specifies a country‟s financial development as a function of the weighted value of the financial
development of its geographic neighbors, trade partners, and FDI partner. SEM models the error
term of a country‟s financial development as a function of the weighted value of its geographic
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neighbors‟ errors, trade partners‟ errors, and FDI partner‟s errors. The regression uses five year
averages for a panel regression.
These models are specified below:
These models are specified below:

SAR :
Yt    WYt  X t  t

(1)

SEM :
Yt    X t   t ;  t  W t  t

(2)

where W is an NXN weight matrix with respect trade or geography; X t is a vector of controls
variables, Yt is an NX1 vector of measures of the dependent variables;  and  are the spatial
autoregressive and spatial error coefficients respectively (which represent the percentage of a
country‟s dependent variable accounted for by the dependent variable of its trade linkages or
geographic neighbors), and t and  t are NX1 matrixes of iid random errors.
To use this approach, I will first test for the presence of spatial dependence using the
Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test which shows whether OLS estimates would be biased and also
helps chose the best spatial model (the one with the largest LM t-statistic). I use both models in
my analysis; based on my test, SEM is the best model for the analysis. While I ran both
regressions only the SEM results are reported.

3.3.4. Weight Matrixes
I construct a spatial weight matrix for geographic neighbors, FDI and trade partners as in Leeson
and Sobel (2006). For financial linkages the weight country A assigns to each country is
calculated as the ratio of each country‟s FDI partner‟s inflows to the country‟s total FDI inflows.
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The same applies to the trade weight matrix, where the weight is calculated as a percentage of
the imports of partner countries to country A‟s total imports. In matrix notation this is
represented below:

 X 11
 X
 1j
 .
W1   .
 .
 X nj

  X nj

.

.

.

.
.
.
.

.

.

X1 j 
 X1 j 
. 
. 
. 
X nn 

X
 nj 

for j =1, 2, ….n.

(3)

where X i, j represents imports or FDI inflows from country j to country i .
For the geography weight matrix, I use the “queen” case of first order contiguity. Thus a
country gives a weight of one to every country it shares a border with (whether vertically,
horizontally or at vertex contacts) and zero otherwise. As with the other weight matrices above,
the geography weight matrix is row standardized. In other words the weight given by each
country to geographic neighbors is calculated as a ratio of 1 to the total number of the countries
that each country shares neighbors with. For example, if country A has 4 neighbors, then each of
these countries is assigned a weight of ¼ by country A.

 1 j

  1 j
 .
W2   .
 .
 
 nj
   nj

.

.

.

.
.
.
.

.

.

1 j 

 1 j 




n j 

 nj 
.
.
.

j =1, 2, ….n.
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(4)

1
0

i j  

if country i and j are neighbors
otherwise

(5)

This makes the weights given by each country to all others sum up to 1. This is represented in
matrix notations above.
The problem with geography though is that countries which are islands may not be
assigned any weights. To deal with this problem, I assigned a dummy which takes a value one if
a country is an island and zero otherwise. If the island dummy is insignificant it will be dropped,
otherwise this will necessitate running the regression without islands.
In the following sections, I will present my results, analyze it, recommend policies and conclude.

3.4. Results
Table 2.1 shows the result for geography while Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 show results for trade
and Financial linkages respectively. Column 4 of all tables show the results for financial
development (measured as domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of
GDP) when all control variables are used, including the lagged level of financial development.
The Financial linkgages results do not include lagged levels due to insufficient data. Column 8 of
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 and column 3 of Table 2.3 show the results for change of financial
development.
The result shows that there is contagion both in levels and first differences in financial
development. That is, countries linked to others (by geography, trade or financial linkages) with
high levels of financial development tend to “catch” high levels of financial development. This is
also true when countries are linked to others experiencing changes of financial development
(such as credit freezes or other shocks). Also, this study finds that financial linkages are the
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dominant channel of contagion followed by trade and geography. The SEM regression results are
the ones reported for analysis based on the LM tests.
The value of lambda shows contagion in financial development. At levels this is 0.184,
0.19 and 0.272 for geography, trade and financial linkages respectively. In other words, countries
catch 0.184, 0.19 and 0.272 of their neighbors‟ levels of financial development, their trade
partners‟ levels of financial development and their financial linkage countries‟ levels of financial
development respectively. Since the Financial linkages regression does not have a lagged term as
the other regressions, for robustness checks, I run the regression using other dependent variables.
Column 2 of Table 2.3 shows that the contagion at levels of financial development (measured as
stock market total value traded as a percentage of GDP) is 0.44. All results are significant at the
1 percent level.
Contagion in changes of financial development is 0.185, and 0.187 for geography and
trade respectively. Since the financial linkages regression does not have a lagged term as the
other regressions, I have no results for the contagion in the changes of financial development
measured as domestic credit to the private sector through financial linkages. However, Table 2.3
shows that contagion through financial linkages, using change of private credit by the banking
sector (banking development) as the dependent variable, is 0.289. These results are significant at
the 5 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels for geography, trade and financial linkages
respectively.
The chapter also finds lagged levels of financial development to account significantly and
positively for the level of financial development, but negatively for the changes of financial
development. The coefficient on lagged FD shows that lagged levels of financial development
accounts for 89 percent of the level of financial development in a country.
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The results are all significant at 1 percent level. This means that there is evidence of institutional
dependence at levels of financial development. Thus countries with previous high levels of
financial development would tend to have higher levels of financial development than countries
with lower levels of financial development.
However, changes in financial development tend to inversely correlate with lagged levels
of financial development, implying convergence. The results show that lagged levels of financial
development inversely accounts for 11 percent of the change of financial development in a
country. These are all significant at the 1 percent levels.
The chapter also finds bureaucratic quality important for financial development. This is
especially true in the trade and geography regressions where bureaucratic quality accounts for
about 3.6 percent and 2.7 percent respectively. These can be found in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.
Legal environment is found to matter only for change of financial development, measured as
domestic banking development. This is found Table 3 in the financial linkages regression. The
results indicate that legal environment is negatively related to changes of private credit by the
banking sector and this accounts for about 10.5 percent. In other words the lower the level of
legal uncertainty in a country, the higher the change of financial development. This finding
supports Koubi (2008). Separately, the risk of expropriation and the risk of repudiation of
contracts do not seem to matter in all regressions.
Finally, in all regressions, the chapter finds per capita GDP as only statistically significant
but not economically significant for financial development. The coefficient on per capita GDP
in all tables indicates that per capita GDP is only statistically significant at 1 per
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3.5. Conclusion
This chapter examines whether financial development is contagious and finds evidence of
contagion through geography, trade and financial linkages. While none of these channels seem to
be solely responsible for the spread of financial development, the chapter finds financial linkages
as the dominant channel both at levels and at first difference followed by trade and geography,
which seem to have similar magnitudes of contagion. The result for contagion for change of
financial development and levels of financial development are very close, suggesting that
changes of financial development, such as credit freezes, are almost as contagious as levels of
financial development.
The chapter also finds evidence of institutional dependence at levels of financial
development. This implies that countries with high previous levels of financial development tend
to have higher levels of financial development than countries with lower previous levels of
financial development. The findings of this chapter also suggest a positive relationship between
financial development and bureaucratic quality and a negative relationship between financial
development and the legal environment.
Based on the findings of this chapter, a suggestion to developing countries as well as
multilateral corporations would be to establish more financial linkages and trade links between
developing countries and the developed world especially in the area of stock market
development. This would be more effective in an environment of bureaucratic efficiency and low
legal uncertainty.
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Table 2.1: Geographic Contagion
Dependent Variable
Level of Financial Development
Independent
Variable

Change in the Level of Financial Development

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Lambda

0.088
(1.377)

0.107*
(1.664)

0.102
(1.584)

0.184**
(2.948)

0.265***
(4.452)

0.189***
(3.035)

0.104
(1.616)

0.185***
(2.965)

Constant

0.475***
(4.083)

0.127*
(1.795)

0.127*
(1.790)

-0.0342
(-1.235)

0.0847
(1.217)

0.004
(0.114)

0.128*
(1.793)

-0.033
(-0.987)

Island

0.090*
(1.680)

0.035
(1.1400)

0.034
(1.112)

0.075*
(2.684)

0.044
(1.341)

…

0.035
(1.118)

0.075***
(2.646)

0.00001**
(2.270)

0.00001***
(2.263)

0.00001***
(2.496)

0.00001***
(2.844)

0.00001**
(2.2593)

0.00001***
(2.489)

0.868***
(17.624)

0.867***
(17.613)

0.891***
(18.677)

-0.130***
(-2.687)

-0.132***
(-2.682)

-0.108***
(-2.270)

0.026***
(2.901)

0.027**
(2.083)

0.027***
(3.065)

0.029**
(2.286)

0.027**
(2.082)

0.0278***
(2.197)

-0.0004
(-0.121)

-0.00003
(-0.090)

Per Capita
Income
Lagged
FD level
Bureaucratic
Quality
Risk of
Expropriation

-0.02
(-1.610)

Risk of
repudiation of
contracts
Legal
Environment
(sum of the
risk of
expropriation
and risk of
repudiation of
contracts).

0.018
(1.371)
-0.00003
(-0.109)

-0.003
(-0.095)

Regional
Dummies

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

R-Squared

0.3448

0.8001

0.800

0.241

0.1603

0.196

0.242

0.207

Log28.562
202.904
202.908
204.462
179.506
192.743
202.914
195.027
likelihood
Number of
Observations
294
294
294
294
294
294
294
294
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable description,
descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 3.
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Table 2.2: Trade Contagion
Dependent Variable
Level of Financial Development
Independent
Variable

Change in the Level of Financial Development

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Lambda

0.163*
(1.660)

0.202**
(2.104)

0.171*
(1.750)

0.190**
(1.965)

0.426***
(5.303)

0.201**
(5.231)

0.174*
(1.795)

0.187**
(1.961)

Constant

0.434**
* (3.719)

0.135*
(1.889)

0.129*
(1.798)

-0.027
(-0.848)

0.066
(0.925)

0.135*
(1.889)

0.127*
(1.798)

0.027
(-0.847)

Island

0.087*
(1.667)

0.023
(0.781)

0.029
(0.925)

0.036
(1.162)

0.024
(0.781)

0.028
(0.920)

Per Capita
Income

0.0000004
(1.619)

0.000004*
(1.820)

0.00001***
(2.713)

0.000004
(1.622)

0.000004*
(1.807)

0.00001***
(2.715)

Lagged
FD level

0.852***
(17.270)

0.866***
(17.681)

0.888***
(18.388)

-0.148***
(-2.991)

-0.133***
(-2.719)

-0.111***
(-2.297)

Bureaucratic
Quality

0.033***
(2.597)

0.034***
(2.597)

0.036***
(2.880)

0.033***
(2.594)

0.033**
(2.611)

0.036***
(2.876)

Risk of
Expropriation
Risk of
repudiation of
contracts

-0.024**
(-2.042)

-0.024**
(-2.039)

0.021
(1.639)

0.021
(1.638)
-0.002
(-0.652)

-0.0003
(-0.770)

Legal
Environment
(sum of the
risk of
expropriation
and risk of
repudiation
of contracts).

-0.002
(-0.632)

-0.0003
(-0.777)

Regional
Dummies

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

NO

R-Squared

0.3515

0.804

0.8014

0.7817

0.1605

0.257

0.247

0.172

Log-likelihood
Number of
Observations

29.924

205.604

203.857

189.761

179.5548

205.605

203.861

194.149

294

294

294

294

294

294

294

294

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable description,
descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 3.
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Table 2.3: Financial Linkages Contagion
Stock Market
Total Value
Traded
(% GDP)

Dependent Variables
Stock Market Total
Change in the level
Value Traded
of Private Credit by
(% GDP)
the Banking Sector
(% GDP)

Domestic Credit to the
Private Sector
(% GDP)

Lambda

0.458***
(3.971)

0.440***
(3.734)

0.289**
(2.122)

0.272**
(1.980)

Constant

-0.064
(-0.222)

0.204
(0.702)

-1.952***
(-3.308)

0.099
(0.289)

Island

0.395***
(2.725)

-0.012
(-0.185)

0.053
(0.334)

Per Capita
Income

0.00001***
(2.972)

0.00001***
(2.643)

0.00001
(1.054)

0.00002***
(6.506)

0.053
(1.331)

0.052
(1.257)

-0.022
(-0.284)

0.023
(0.476)

Legal Environment
(sum of the risk of
expropriation and risk
of repudiation of
contracts)

-0.033
(-1.528)

-0.025
(-1.076)

0.105**
(2.324)

0.002
(0.009)

Regional Dummies

YES

NO

YES

NO

R-Squared

0.193

0.316

0.193

0.374

Independent
Variable

Lagged FD level
Bureaucratic Quality
Risk of Expropriation
Risk of repudiation of
contracts

Log-likelihood
-30.257
-148.298
-30.257
5.588
Number of
Observations
90
90
90
90
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.
Variable description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 3.
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Chapter 4
Is Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization Perpetuated in Africa?
4.1. Introduction
Though many factors have been found to account for the underdevelopment of African countries,
ethno-linguistic fractionalization has been gaining increasing attention in the development
literature. For example, the relationship between institutions, ethno-linguistic fractionalization
and growth has been explored by many researchers. This includes the indirect effects of colonial
institutions on the ability of Africans to trade peacefully. Colonial institutions in Africa are found
to have exacerbated fractionalization, which led to the poor growth of African countries.
Alternatively, good institutions mitigate fractionalization and this leads to economic growth.
Some of other findings are that ethno-linguistic fractionalization negatively impacts economic
growth and policies in Africa, and this is responsible for poor growth in Africa (Leeson, 2005;
Easterly, 2001; Easterly and Levine , 1997).
The relationship between linguistic diversity, political stability and democracy has also
been examined. Linguistic diversity has positive impact on political instability. It is also
discovered that democracy eliminates the negative impact of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on
growth. There is also a positive relationship between ethnic homogeneity and trust and this
relationship reinforces the positive relationship between trust and economic growth (Collier,
1999; Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997).

Cunning and Fay (1993) also explore the

relationship between long-run growth and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
The relationship between colonization and growth has also been explored by many
researchers. European colonization, for example, has a negative impact on growth. Colonial
heritage, measured as the identity of the Metropolitan ruler and the degree of Economic
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Penetration (GNP/GDP), is the reason for low average growth rate of GDP per capita and the
observed heterogeneities in Africa. This explains differences in investment–output ratio,
education attainment and the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. It has also been
established that there is a negative relationship between the number of years of colonial rule and
growth. Also, by exploring the effect of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization on the
quality of growth, other findings are that linguistic and ethnic (racial) fractionalization are
strongly negatively related to growth, but religious fractionalization is not (Bertocchi and
Canova, 2002; Grier, 1999; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Kurlat, Easterly and Wacziarg, 2003).
Some other works in the area of economics of language include the explanation of the
evolution of languages, the investigation of the economic and demographic determinants of
destination language proficiency among immigrants and the connection of the connection
between trade and languages. These researchers claim that trade requires language. (Rubinstein,
1998; Chiswick, 2008; Smith, 1776).
While the main focus of Leeson (2005), for example, is that regardless of heterogeneity
individuals can realize gains from trade, this chapter asserts that trade can lead to linguistic
homogeneity in a society. In other words, if and as diverse individuals trade, the walls of
linguistic fractionalization will eventually be lowered to the barest minimal if not utterly
destroyed as a result of their interaction. The chapter posits that unless incidents and events such
as destructive colonial policies that can sever the interaction of diverse individuals occur, African
countries would have experienced an increase in trade. This increased trade would then lead to
linguistic homogeneity.
Though many papers have looked at ethno-linguistic fractionalization and its effects on
growth and development, no paper has empirically examined the determinants of ethno-linguistic
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fractionalization. This chapter fills the gap by providing an empirical analysis of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization using both OLS and Spatial Autoregressive model (SAR). The rest of this
chapter is organized as follows. In the following section I examine the possibility of ethnolinguistic fractionalization decline in Africa, followed by what exactly transpired during colonial
rule, methodology, results, possibility of ethno-linguistic homogeneity and conclusion in sections
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively.

4.2. The Possibility of Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization Decline in Pre-colonial Africa
4.2.1. Pre-colonial Africa and the Decline of Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization
African countries are among the world‟s most ethnically diverse countries. According to Easterly
and Levine (2001), African countries are among fourteen of the world‟s fifteen most ethnically
heterogeneous societies, with Uganda being the world‟s number one. However, before
colonization, though fractionalized, Africa was one big society with no official significant
differences. In order to commute from one area to the other, people did not need any documents
or permission as long as they had the means of transportation and traveled through other
settlements peacefully.
Though sometimes special gifts and offerings were given to the chiefs and fetish priests
of other societies through which one travelled or undertook business transactions, society was
more relaxed and movement as well as assimilation into other societies and cultures was very
common. Leeson (2005) points out how outsiders wanting to join a particular community gave
special gifts to the Earth‟s Priests and agreed to respect the community‟s rituals (as a signal of
credibility) and were given the possibility of trading with the existing group members. He also
documents that this offer of gifts was rarely mandatory.
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This is accentuated by the fact that some languages and cultures are common to a lot of
ethnic groups across African countries today. For example, there are at least three tribes in
Ghana who speak same language as other tribes in Togo, Benin, Nigeria and Cote D‟Ivoire. In
other words, this shows that interaction of different societies through trade (free trade) was
highly possible even in the face of fractionalization.
Domestic, long distance and international trade developed in Africa with the resultant
social interaction between different ethnic groups prior to European‟s arrival on the continent
(Cohen, 1969: 6). There were also commercial interactions in pre-colonial Africa to the extent of
creating homogeneity between different diverse people (Thornton, 1995: 194). Thus, without any
interruption, there was the possibility that the walls of fractionalization might be lowered to their
minimal levels if not utterly destroyed.
One way ethno-linguistic fractionalization could have declined in the absence of colonial
rule is that, with time, some languages and cultures could become dominant over others in each
society or a lingua franca could have evolved without colonial interruption. In every society,
each group is identified with a certain kind of occupation. Typical examples are farmers,
(including shepherds who travel widely in search of pasture), and traders. The latter are very
influential as they move from one place to the other and must interact with the indigenous people
in order to transact business with them. Consequently, they tend to spread their language and
culture from place to place. Commercial interactions „help explain the great cultural similarities
between many different peoples south of the equatorial forest‟ (Vansina, 1968: 325).
In Ghana, for example, out of many languages and dialects there are four dominant ones.
One of these, Akan, is widely spoken because the ethnic group that speaks it (the Ashantis) trade
widely and also dominate the entertainment (or music) industry, and they use their music and
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trade to spread the use of the language in the whole country. There is hardly a Ghanaian who
cannot speak or understand at least a word or a phrase in Akan. Many believe that Ghana will
one day adopt Akan as the national language.
There is no denying the fact that most countries that have adopted one language today
have gone through an evolution similar to the one depicted above. This process of evolution
from ethno-linguistic fractionalization and others reported in some papers relating to different
countries‟ experience could have taken place in Africa too, but this was interrupted or slowed
down as a result of colonization.

4.2.2. Cost and Benefits of Learning a New Language in Pre-colonial Africa
Chiswick (2008) points out that language skill is human capital, since it satisfies the three
requirements of a human capital namely productivity, costliness and embodiment in a person.
The first two of these attributes imply that there is a benefit and cost associated with learning,
adopting or developing a language that will serve the common good of a fractionalized society as
Africa. If the cost is higher than the benefit, then the society or individuals who make up the
society will stick to their different languages, instead. The opposite holds as well.
One of the costs of learning a dominant language or developing a common language in
pre-colonial Africa is time; it takes time for one to learn a new language, especially so for the old
because, the older a person is the longer and more difficult it becomes. It could also take time for
parents and relatives to teach the young this new language, but in pre-colonial Africa where
interaction among diverse individuals is free the process could be much more expedited than it
was, if any, under colonial rule. Chiswick (2008) points out that exposure to the dominant
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language is a determinant of the cost of learning the language. Apparently, this exposure was
much easier in the absence colonial barriers and colonial immigration restriction policies.
Another determinant of the cost of learning a new language, according to Chiswick
(2008) is social distance. Social distance was much smaller in pre-colonial Africa. I can still
relate pre-colonial Africa society to some societies in Africa today. In the Volta Region of Ghana
(Ghana was divided into nine regions by colonial masters), the dominant language is Ewe.
Besides this language, there are many other languages. You can travel five miles away from one
society where Ewe is spoken to another society where a different language is spoken. But since
this minor society can interact freely with the native Ewe speaking society, almost all of them are
proficient in Ewe though not necessary literate (may not be able to read or write Ewe). So the
absence of barriers and social distance in pre-colonial Africa reduced the cost of learning a
dominant language.
Another factor that determines the cost of learning a new language, as pointed out by
Chiswick (2008), is “distance” between one‟s mother language and the dominant language.
Though Africa has many languages, one thing these languages mostly have in common is the
syllabus. You can almost write every language using a certain set of alphabets. There are many
languages which have certain words in common as well. This means that it will be easy for a
speaker of one African language to learn to speak another or most African languages.
One of the benefits of learning language skills is productivity. Chiswick (2008) points out
that, language skills are productive in consumption activities. This implies that it will enable
people to find good quality goods and services at lower prices. Trading in Africa, including
today‟s, requires one‟s ability to negotiate prices and the more proficient you are in a trade
language the higher your chances of success.
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Not only would learning a dominant language in pre-colonial Africa enable people do well
in the market, it will also make them find good jobs in the labor market. Chiswick (2008)
documents that, this will enable agents to execute their jobs efficiently. He also points out that
other social benefits include one‟s ability to network and make a wide range of friends outside
one‟s linguistic enclave and the enhancement of civic involvement by gaining full political and
economic rights of the dominant spoken language community.
In pre-colonial Africa, learning the larger society‟s language could be seen as a signal of
credibility and could result in gaining access to full benefits of the larger society. For example,
Leeson (2005) points out that pre-colonial agents used signals such as property usage, religious
practices and the individual‟s relationship to authority to minimize the social distance between
sender and receiver to send their credibility to outsiders they wanted to trade with.

4.3. The Worsening of Ethno-linguist Fractionalization during Colonial Rule
Colonial rule did a lot to stymie the decline of ethno-linguistic fractionalization in Africa. Leeson
(2005) explored the indirect effects of colonial institutions on the ability of Africans to trade
peacefully. He explained how artificial colonial institutions such as forced allegiance to an
authority disabled the signal that individuals look to when evaluating the credibility of outsiders
to trade, which resulted in the creation of smaller sub-groups among broader ones to eliminate
the risk of interacting with those who are remotely unknown. Thus this colonial distortion of
trade further reduced social and commercial interaction that would expose individuals to and
cause them to learn a trade language.
Second, colonial rule inhibited free movement of individuals in Africa and this was no
environment for culture or linguistic convergence. Leeson (2005) points out that as opposed to
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pre-colonial Africa where people could come and go as they pleased, so that it was possible for
people to be members of multiple communities and hence exchange with a wide range of
individuals, colonial land policy created noise in this signal used to convey credibility by legally
requiring colonial agents to stay attached to their ruler-allocated areas of land. Such a colonial
policy also restricted migration as was the case of Basutoland in 1903 when colonial law forbade
the provision of land to non-Basotho people.
Limited mobility under colonial rule was therefore one of the factors that reduced the
need to adopt or learn the most widely spoken language(s) as the cost of doing so became more
than the benefit, if any.
Another way colonization exacerbated ethno-linguistic fractionalization in Africa is that
colonial masters separated African countries into territories which may never be reconciled to
each other, perhaps, forever. The separation has far reaching consequences of maintaining ethnolinguistic borders especially across countries. As mentioned above, different African countries
societies with common languages and cultures have now been divided by walls of colonization.
Societies, who once saw themselves as one, though far apart, because of language and culture,
now see each other as aliens.
Though the walls of ethno-linguistic fractionalization may gradually break down in each
colony (now country) it may never break down across countries. This is because these colonies
are now trained to see one another as different entities. For example, the people from the Volta
Region of Ghana speak the same language and have same culture as about half the population of
Togo, but are considered strangers in Togo and treated as such. On the other hand, this Volta
Region of Ghana speaks totally a different language and has somewhat different culture from
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some regions of Ghana. The same is true of Akan (the most widely spoken language in Ghana)
speaking Ivorians.
Moreover, colonization led to the proliferation of different institutions in Africa that made
it difficult to reduce fractionalization. Leeson (2005) points out that, colonial created institutions
severed the communication mechanism between socially heterogeneous individuals in Africa by
reducing the signals (pre-colonial institutions) that enabled communication and interaction as
this increased the cost of commercial interaction. Legal systems of each colonial Master are
different and this made it difficult for Africa to adopt an institutional framework that supported
continent-wide development initiatives such as free trade areas. These legal frameworks that
distorted the already established ones before them helped perpetuate ethno-linguistic
fractionalization.
Colonial rulers made matters worse by again dividing their colonies into regions and
districts which still persist today. This was an attempt to facilitate colonial rule but now
permanently left these internal groups at conflict with each other over lands, resources and
domains. Leeson (2005) documents that colonial policy led to a break-down of the ability of
African people to interact freely and, instead, led to a sharp increase in property disputes among
Africans under colonialism.
Finally, one would have thought that the introduction of the language of the colonist
should mitigate linguistic fractionalization but what happened was the exact opposite. Unlike
Latin America where Spanish was imposed by colonial masters and everyone was supposed to
learn this language, the introduction of the language of the colonist was intended for only a few
selected Africans, who helped in the facilitation of communication of the colonial masters with
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the Africans. Specifically, the introduction of these languages was just to serve the means of the
colonial masters in extracting from the continent.
One way this could have turned out to help Africa was that when a larger population of
each country gets to learn the colonial master‟s language, it could help to promote homogeneity.
However, one could only learn this language (official language) through formal education, which
is costly. Only the very rich could afford this formal education. Easterly and Levine (1997)
document that more than 90 percent of the population in most African countries does not speak
the official language at home. In other words, these official languages tend to add to linguistic
diversity in Africa rather than help in creating homogeneity.
The whole of Africa was not colonized by colonial masters speaking the same language.
This means that ranging from the British to the Portuguese; four or more languages were added
to the several languages spoken in Africa rather than replace them (a situation that would have
helped linguistic fractionalization in Africa). If a greater proportion, if not all, of the population
of Africa countries were able to speak its colonial master‟s language the outcome would have
been close to desirable.
Post-colonial attempts to use the colonial master‟s language to reduce linguistic
fractionalization in Africa did not result in anything different from failure. Most African
countries made it mandatory for every school going person to learn the official language
(colonial master‟s language) of another African country. An example is Ghana, which has all its
neighbors colonized by France and hence speak French. Hence, every Ghanaian in high school
was made to learn French after the mid 80‟s.
This project, however, did not seem to achieve the intended goal – to enable the average
educated Ghanaian to communicate with citizens of neighboring countries who happen to speak
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French. The main reason for this failure is again attributable to the scars of colonization –
colonial barriers. Bertocchi and Canova (2002) document that the impact of colonization may
survive past political independence and those colonies kept paying the consequences of their
history even after independence was achieved.
Due to these colonial barriers, which has now become official barriers, even if one learns
the neighbors‟ language he could do little with it (because hardly does anyone speak that
language in Ghana) and hence tend to forget it a few years after leaving school. If there were no
official barriers and people could travel freely to neighboring countries, say, to trade continuous
use of the neighbors language could cause them to be proficient not only in their own official
language, but also in the language of their neighboring countries.
Cameroon is an example of the possibility of speaking a second official language in the
absence of colonial barriers. One part of Cameroon was colonized by the French and the other by
the British. However, since these two regions do not have any official barriers, most
Cameroonians who speak French also speak English and vice versa, though they may not be
equally proficient in both. This is because there is a free interaction between these two parts of
Cameroon and as they trade or conduct any commercial activities they put into use the official
languages they learnt at school thereby becoming more proficient in both. This same example
may be true in the case of Canada.

4.4. Methodology
4.4.1. Data
This study estimates the impact of colonial rule (number of years of colonial rule) on ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The data comprises a cross-section of 46 African countries from
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1980-2000. Data on ethno-linguistic fractionalization is taken from two sources. The first one is
the measure of linguistic fractionalization computed by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Kurlat,
Easterly and Wacziarg (2003). This variable is based on the shares of languages spoken as
mother tongues. The reason for the choice of this variable is that it is entirely based on language
and hence different from the effect of any racial or ethnic features.
Even though the reason for the separation of this variable by Alesina, Devleeschauwer,
Kurlat, Easterly and Wacziarg (2003) was to show that in some cases ethnic fractionalization
matters more for growth than just language diversity, in most of their main regression linguistic
fractionalization does have a bigger effect (and higher level of significance) on growth than
ethnic fractionalization. I thus employ both this variable and ethno-linguistic fractionalization in
my regressions.
The ethno-linguistic measure is taken from ELF Dataset, which is compiled by researchers
at the Miklukho-Maklai Ethnological Institute in the Soviet Union based on the probability that
two randomly selected individuals in a country will belong to different ethno-linguistic groups.
This data is available for 1961. Easterly and Levine (2001) document that many researchers
including geolinguistics use this dataset.
The population, GNP and GDP data are taken from the World Bank‟s databases. One of
the measures of colonial rule, colonial penetration (also referred to as “drain”) is the ratio of a
country‟s GNP to GDP in 1960 as in Bertocchi and Canova (2002). The lower the value of GNP
the higher the level of colonial penetration and the lower the ratio. They use this as a measure of
colonial drain following the drain of wealth thesis. According to them this measure captures how
colonial surplus was further extracted by Metropolitan countries by reducing indigenous capital
accumulation through repatriation of profits, pensions, interest on loans and salaries.
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Institutional measures are taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Data
on colonial rule is taken from the World Fact Book. The length of colonization was compiled
based on Barro (1991) which provides data including dates of independence. A detailed
description of the data, together with summary measures is given in Appendix 5.

4.4.2. Model
Both OLS and a spatial econometric model, SAR (Spatial Autoregressive Model) are employed.
SAR specifies a country‟s ethno-linguistic fractionalization as a function of the weighted value
of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization of its geographic neighbors. The models are specified
below:

OLS:

where,

is the number of years a country has been colonized,

is the volume of

bilateral trade between an African country and all other African countries,

is the

equals 1 if a country‟s post colonial borders

index of political stability in a country and

existed before colonial rule and zero otherwise. Colonial rule is expected to have positive impact
on ethno-linguistic fractionalization.

SAR:

Yt    WYt  X t  t

(2)
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where X t is a vector of controls variables specified above, Yt is an NX1 vector of measures of
the dependent variables;  is the spatial autoregressive and spatial error coefficients (which
represents geographic contagion in the dependent variable), and t and  t are NX1 matrixes of
iid random errors. W is an NXN weight matrix for geographic neighbors.
For the geographic weight matrix, I use the “queen” case of first order contiguity. Thus a
country gives a weight of one to every country it shares a border with (whether vertically,
horizontally or at vertex contacts) and zero otherwise. The geographic weight matrix is row
standardized. In other words the weight given by each country to geographic neighbors is
calculated as a ratio of 1 to the total number of countries that each country shares neighbors with.
For example, if country A has 4 neighbors, then each of these countries is assigned a weight of ¼
by country A.
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This makes the weights given by each country to all others sum up to 1. This is represented in
matrix notations above.
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To use the SAR approach, I will first test for the presence of spatial dependence using the
Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test which shows whether OLS estimates would be biased and also
helps to chose the best spatial model (the one with the largest LM t-statistic).

4.5. Results
4.5.1. Main Findings
The results suggest that the number of years of colonial rule in an African country affects both
the country‟s volume level of linguistic fractionalization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
Table 3.1 shows that the impact of colonial rule on ethno-linguistic fractionalization and
linguistic fractionalization is positive. The OLS regression results show that they are significant
at 5% and 10% respectively. The significance of these results however depends on whether we
control for institutions or not. For linguistic fractionalization, without controlling for institutions
the number of years of colonial rule is insignificant. However, once I control for institutions both
the number of years of colonial rule and institutions become significant. For ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, the result flips; the number of years of colonial rule becomes insignificant
when I control for institutions.
This could mean that while the number years of colonial rule matters for linguistic
fractionalization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization, the effect of the number of years of
colonial rule on linguistic fractionalization is exacerbated in face in the presence of weak
institutions.
Similarly the colonial history dummies are significant in the linguistic fractionalization
regressions only after controlling for institutions. The results (in both Table 3.1 and Table 3.2)
suggest that British and French colonization worsened linguistic fractionalization in Africa.
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British colonization however, appears to reduce ethno-linguistic fractionalization when we do
not control for institutions. This is shown in Table 3.1. Thus while British colonization seem to
exacerbate linguistic fractionalization, it reduces ethno-linguistic fractionalization. A possible
explanation for this could be that since the British practice a divide and rule system, it was able
to merge different ethnic groups into one society creating an artificial ethnic group of many
ethnic groups thereby replacing many natural ethnic groups by few artificial ones. However,
people were not forced to abandon their native languages the way they were forced to be
separated from their societies. Placing different ethnicities into one society (or now country) then
increased the linguistic fractionalization in those societies as explained earlier.
Tangential to the above, colonial penetration is significant in all regression in Table 3.1
and Table 3.2. The results show that countries which have high level of “drain” (low colonial
penetration ratio) are more fractionalized that countries which have low levels of “drain”.
In Table 3.2, I report the results for the SAR model. The main aim of this regression is to
find out if there is a spatial dependence in the dependent variables; that is if countries which have
high levels of linguistic fractionalization or ethno-linguistic fractionalization tend to be
neighbors. The result shows that linguistic fractionalization is contagious while ethno-linguistic
fractionalization is not. This is evident in the coefficient of rho being significant in the SAR
regression for linguistic fractionalization as opposed to ethno-linguistic fractionalization. A
possible reason for why the latter is not contagious is that ethnic groups are exogenous and they
emerge rather than are created. Languages, however, can be created, adopted, spread or
dominated.
Controlling for spatial dependence also made all the independent variables, except
colonial penetration, insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that all the independent
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variables are spatially correlated. All of them are measures of colonial rule and are directly
related to colonial. Thus the geographic weight matrix therefore captures and removes this
spatial correlation making these variables insignificant. Colonial penetration (GNP/GDP), the
only independent variable significant is an indirect measure of colonial rule. Thus, we are still
able to capture the indirect effect of colonial penetration on both measures of fractionalization.
Finally institutions seem to matter for linguistic fractionalization but not ethno-linguistic
fraction fractionalization. This supports Leeson (2005) that bad institutions exacerbate
fractionalization. Controlling for institutions in the linguistic fractionalization regressions makes
the measures of colonization significant and the coefficients of rho significant in Table 3.1 and
Table 3.2 respectively. This can be explained by the fact that while people can change their
language or adopt other languages, it is difficult for them, if not impossible, to change their
ethnicity or race no matter how good institutions become. This ethnicity (racial) component in
the ethno-linguistic fractionalization measure makes it insensitive or inversely sensitive to
institutions.

4.6. Is there a Possibility of Linguistic Homogeneity in Post-colonial Africa?
4.6.1. Political and or Economic Integration
Though one cannot say for certain whether ethno-linguistic fractions can reduce enough in
Africa after the harms caused by colonial rule, looking at what is going on other continents
suggests that there is a possibility. Chiswick (2008) documents that English is becoming a
“lingua franca” in Europe following the reduction of legal barriers that now facilitates the
movement of people and the removal of non-tariff and tariff barriers that facilitates the free
mobility of goods (trade) across EU countries.
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If this EU paragon could be epitomized in Africa, free trade and free mobility of
economic agents could call for, if not result in, a lingua franca. While this conclusion is feasible I
do not want to hasten to suggest what language that would be. While such an economic
integration alone could work the magic that could have happened in an uninterrupted precolonial Africa the choice of this new language now may be easier in the presence political
integration as well, where individuals would view the speaking of such language as a sign of
demonstrating patriotism or nationalism.
This though, in my view will be more difficult than, if not as difficult as, implementing
an economic integration. In other words there are benefits as well as costs associated with
achieving linguistic homogeneity now as, if not more than, it was in pre-colonial Africa.

4.6.2. Costs and Benefits of Implementing Policies that could Reduce Ethno-linguistic
Fractionalization
The costs associated with implementing an economic integration that will increase free mobility
of people and goods in Africa today should not be different from similar ones executed in other
parts of the world. Most governments will fear the loss of revenues such as customs duties
(export duties and import duties). However, governments can make up for this by increasing
excise duties such as production taxes, sales taxes, value added taxes, and sin tax, among others.
Another problem is that most African countries are among the most corrupt countries in
the world, and top government officials who have a stake in these duties may rather prefer these
colonial barriers, now official barriers to stay. Suffice it to mention here that attempts to establish
economic unions such as the Economic Union of West African States (ECOWAS) have been
underway for some time now.
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Another cost some Africans would have to bear in promoting one language on the
continent or in their countries (if one is to be chosen instead of a dominant one or a few
dominant ones emerging naturally) will be to let go their language for another country‟s. While
Chiswick (2008) implies that becoming proficient in the wider society‟s language does not (and
should not) give rise to negative connotations about one‟s own language or culture, the
temptation to see it that way could be minimized if economic integration comes with political
integration where all members see all resources of the union, including the chosen language, as
belonging to everyone in the in union.
Other costs of linguistic homogeneity include the cost of schooling (to non-native
speakers of the chosen language) needed to learn such a language unless it naturally evolved. If
this comes with a political integration, it should be possible for the central government to
sponsor such training and education.
Benefits associated with linguistic homogeneity in Africa include all the benefits
mentioned above (obtainable in pre-colonial setting) and the following. Chiswick (2008)
suggests that adopting the language of a larger community imply that one would be exposed a
wide range of opportunities including economic, social and civic opportunities. This means that
ethno-linguistic homogeneity in Africa will make an average African, who once was limited to
the facilities of its small country will now have a choice where to live and or work.
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Kurlat, Easterly and Wacziarg (2003) find that linguistic
fractionalization is strongly negatively related to growth. This means that policies, such as
economic integration and political integration, that will reduce linguistic fractionalization in
Africa will increase growth as well. That means, though some people will have to give up their
language, this will lead to economic development.
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This chapter finds a positive relationship between colonization (including colonial
barriers) in African countries and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. This means that polices such
as the removal of colonial (trade) barriers will increase trade, reduce linguistic fractionalization
which will in turn increase growth in Africa. This is the main focus or argument of this chapter.

4.7. Conclusion
The findings of this chapter show that the length of colonization actually worsened the
prevalence of linguistic fractionalization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization in Africa instead
of mitigating it. This is supported by the results of this chapter which show that the number of
years a country was colonized has a positive impact on the linguistic and ethno-linguistic
fractionalization of the country.
The results also support the view of Leeson (2005) that bad institutions worsen
fractionalization and that this is the reason for the increasing fractionalization and poor growth in
Africa. Apart from the division of the continent into colonies, different foreign languages and
institutions introduced by colonial rulers made it difficult for Africa to integrate. The chapter
suggests that the success of Africa in mitigating or eradicating the effects of linguistic
fractionalization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization in Africa depends on the emergence of
economic and political integration of the continent.
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Table 3.1. OLS (with and without institutions)
Dependent Variable

Independent
Variable
Constant
Colonial Rule
(no. of year)
Institutions
Colonial
Penetration
British Colonial
Dummy
French Colonial
Dummy
Belgium Colonial
Dummy
Border dummy

Ethno-Linguistic
Fractionalization
284.697** *
(3.98)
0.208
(1.62)
-5.153
(-0.76)
-2.222***
(-3.04)
-15.526
(-0.87)
1.684
(0.11)
-3.078
(-0.15)
-2.756
(-0.27)

Linguistic
Fractionalization
2.910** *
(3.65)
0.003**
(2.14)
-0.202 ***
(-2.63)
-0.025***
(-3.21)
0.642**
(1.99)
0.554*
(1.78)
0.338
(0.79)
0.030
(0.20)

Ethno-Linguistic
Fractionalization
251.409***
(-0.18)
0.140*
(1.67)

Linguistic
Fractionalization
1.626**
(2.23)
0.0002
(0.25)

-1.890***
(-3.47)
-24.043*
(1.67)
-3.888
(-0.31)
-4.257
(-0.22)
-5.001
(-0.52)

-0.013*
(-1.73)
0.306
(1.03)
0.336
(1.13)
0.263
(0.73)
-0.063
( -0.40)

R-Squared
0.26
0.35
0.24
0.15
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.
Variable description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 5.
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Table 3.2. SAR (with and without institutions)
Dependent Variable

Independent
Variable
Constant
Rho
Colonial Rule
(no. of year)
Institutions
Colonial
Penetration
British Colonial
Dummy
French Colonial
Dummy
Belgium Colonial
Dummy
Border dummy

Linguistic
Fractionalization
0.246
(1.595)
0.317***
(2.49)
0.0005
(1.065)
-0.002
(-0.039)
-0.0004
(-0.400)
0.251*
(1.75)
0.210*
(1.62)
-0.028
(-0.146)
0.027
(0.270)

Spatial Error Model (SAR)
Ethno-Linguistic
Linguistic
Fractionalization
Fractionalization
40.984** *
0.246*
(2.778)
(1.710)
0.025
0.312***
(0.193)
(2.424)
0.026
0.0004
(0.661)
(1.081)
6.263
(1.55)
0.045
-0.0004
(0.482)
(-0.399)
-12.604
0.249**
(-0.949)
(1.945)
5.778
0.209*
(0.478)
(1.671)
6.778
-0.028
(0.371)
(-0.144)
0.024
0.027
(0.194)
(0.270)

Ethno-Linguistic
Fractionalization
48.862***
(3.458)
0.051
(0.384)
0.041
(1.033)

0.023
(0.245)
-3.564
(-0.293)
10.661
(0.894)
5.672
(0.303)
3.445
(0.36)

R-Squared
0.17
0.12
0.17
0.08
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%
Variable description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 5.
.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
The dissertation focuses on economic contagion in financial and international development. Each
chapter is based on an idea in either in financial economics or international economics or both.
The main channels of contagion found in this study are trade, geography and financial linkages.
Chapter 2 explores contagion in exchange market pressure, currency crisis and currency
stability and identifies trade linkages, geographic linkages and financial markets as the channels
of contagion. It models contagion using two spatial econometric models namely spatial error
mode and spatial autoregressive model. A panel of 119 countries is considered in this chapter. It
finds that trade linkages are more effective channels of contagion than geography in currency
crisis, currency stability and exchange market pressure in general.
The findings of chapter 2 also suggests that there stable currency periods are more
contagious than crisis periods. This implies that enforcing trade will do more good than harm to
a country. Another significant contribution of this chapter is that, though trade, is the major
channel of contagion in currency crisis, the geographic channel should not be ignored. It suggests
that the geography channel or effect help explain why currency crises are largely regional.
Chapter 3 estimates contagion in financial development both at levels and at first
difference. Using spatial error model the paper investigate whether financial development is
contagious. The chapter investigates whether changes of financial development are contagious.
The channels of contagion in this chapter are trade, geography and financial linkages. It finds
that financial linkages are a better channel of transmission than trade and geography. The
findings of the chapter also confirm those of other studies that legal uncertainty and bureaucratic
delays also determine financial development.
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Chapter 4 attempts to examine what has made it difficult for a single language to spread
through the African continent or for the evolution of a lingua franca in Africa. It explains that
trade would have been the main means by which this could have happened, but the process got
interrupted by colonial rule. It explains that while Pre-colonial Africa would have faced costs
and benefits in adopting a single language, the benefits did outweigh the costs. However,
colonization increased the cost and this makes it difficult, if not impossible, for post-colonial
Africa to reduce their levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization or linguistic fractionalization,
important determinants of growth. It suggests that the only way the process could get restored is
a political and or economic integration of African countries. These recommendations are
however not without a cost and it may take a reasonably long time for Africans to pay the price
in order to reap the benefits of integration.
In conclusion, the dissertation finds that, trade, financial linkages and geography are very
important transmission mechanisms of contagious economic events. Addressing these channels
strategically can minimize the spread of negative shocks and the costs they bring and maximize
the spread of positive economic shocks and lead to an increased growth of countries around the
world, especially developing countries. In other words, strong economic unions as well as trade
liberalization in physical assets and financial assets can be important tools used especially by
poor countries to harness, attract, or catch the positive externalities coming from other countries
around them. These same tools can be used to repel, reduce, neutralize or undo negative
spillovers countries would otherwise have to consume in the world community.
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Appendix 1: Variable Description, Descriptive Statistics, and Sources for chapter 3
Variable Name (source)
Description
Mean (std)
Dependent Variables:
EMP - Exchange market A linear combination of exchange rates and 0.767 (25.484)
Pressure (2)
international reserves
Currency Crises (2)

Excess EMP (%)

2.400 (13.822)

Currency Stability (2)

Absolute Value EMP shortfall (%)

0.013 (0.020)

Exchange Rate (2)

Official exchange rate (LCU per DM, period
average)

Independent
Variables:
Current Account (2)

-3.418 (6.359)
Annual current account per GDP (%)

-3.681 (83.069)

Domestic Credit (1)

Annual growth rate of Domestic credit provided
by banking sector per GDP (%)
11.155 (45.362)

M2 (1)

Money and quasi money to total reserve ratio

CPI (1)

Annual growth of consumer Prices (% )

0.375 (6.192)

GDP Growth (1)

Annual growth rate of GDP (%)

4.203 (5.527)

Unemployment (1)

Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)

Geographic
Neighbors(4)

Number of neighbors a country has based on
first-order contiguity

1.
2.
3.
4.

World Development Indicator; The World Bank Databases
Direction Of Trade; IMF Databases
International Financial Statistics, IMF Databases
CIA, The World Fact Book
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Appendix 2: List of Countries for chapter 3
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of
Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China, P.R.: Mainland
Colombia
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Republic of
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia, The
Georgia
Germany

Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
China, P.R.: Hong
Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic
Republic of
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Democratic
People's Rep. of
Korea, Republic of
Lebanon
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Netherlands
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New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia and Montenegro
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Appendix 3: Variable Description, Descriptive Statistics, and Sources for chapter 4
Variable
Mean (Std.
Name (source)
Description
Dev.)
Dependent Variables:
Financial Development – Domestic Credit to the Private Sector (% GDP)
Private Credit to
the Private Sector Stock Market Total Value Traded (% GDP)
(1)
Private Credit by the Banking Sector (% GDP)

0.473(0.384)
25.052(32.749)
0.805(3.140)

Independent Variables:
Per Capita Income (1)

GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)

Bureaucratic Quality (5)

Index of bureaucratic (1-10): The higher the better.

Risk of Expropriation (5)

Index of the risk of outright confiscation of private
investment (1-10). The higher the better.

7.239(2.796)

Risk of repudiation of
contracts (5)

Index of changes in government and or its behavior
(1-10). The higher the better.

6.602(2.778)

Legal Environment (5)

13.841(5.502)

Trade Partners (2)

Index of legal uncertainty. Sum of the risks of
expropriation and repudiation of contracts (2-20).
The higher the lower the legal uncertainty.
A country‟s neighbor based on queen first order
contiguity criteria
Countries that engage in bilateral trade

FDI Partners (3)

Countries that receive FDI inflows from each other

Geographic Neighbors(4)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

World Development Indicator; The World Bank Databases
Direction Of Trade; IMF Databases
OECD Databases
CIA, The World Fact Book
International Country Risk Guide; ICRG Dataset

81

7.0341e+003
(8.9556e+003)
3.304(1.743)

Appendix 4: List of Countries for chapter 4
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil
Burundi
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China
Czech Republic
Colombia
Congo, Dem.
Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Cyprus
Denmark
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab
Rep.
El Salvador
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon

Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong,
China
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic
Rep.
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Luxemburg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
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Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and
Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
United Arab
Emirates
Uruguay
United States
Venezuela, RB
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Appendix 5: Variable Description, Descriptive Statistics, and Sources
Variable Name (source)

Description

Mean (Std. Dev.)

Dependent Variables:
Linguistic Fractionalization(3)
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization(6)

Index of linguistic diversity (%)
Index of ethnic and linguistic diversity (% )

0.623(0.291)
0.616(0.26707)

Independent Variables:
Colonial Penetration(1)

Institution (5)

GNP/GDP computed for 1960: The lower the value
the higher the extent of colonial penetration or
drain.
Index of institutional quality computed as an
average of three variables (bureaucratic quality,
risk of expropriation, and the risk of repudiation of
contracts ): (1-10); the higher the better.

Colonial Rule (4)

Number of years a country has been colonized by
all possible colonial Masters (years)

Border dummy

A dummy specifying whether a country‟s borders
were created by colonial masters

98.993(4.341)

2.327(0.993)

106.065(120.9877)

Colonial Dummy

A dummy showing which colonial master
colonized a country

1. World Development Indicator; The World Bank Databases
2. Direction Of Trade; IMF Databases
3. Alesina et al. (2003) Dataset
4. CIA, The World Fact Book
5. International Country Risk Guide; ICRG Dataset
6. Elf Dataset
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Appendix 6: List of Countries
Equatorial
Algeria
Guinea
Angola
Ethiopia
Benin
Gabon
Burkina Faso
Gambia, The
Burundi
Ghana
Cameroon
Guinea
Cape Verde
Central African RepublicGuineaBissau
Chad
Kenya
Comoros
Liberia
Congo, Rep.
Libya
Of the
Madagascar
Congo, Dem.
Rep. Of the
Malawi
Cote d'lvoire
Malawi
Djibouti
Mauritania
Egypt
Mauritius
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Morocco
Mozambiqe
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra
Leone
Somalia
South
Africa
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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